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[...] one must stop believing that the dead are just the departed and that the departed do 
ŶothiŶg. OŶe ŵust stop pƌeteŶdiŶg to kŶoǁ ǁhat is ŵeaŶt ďǇ ͞to die͟ aŶd espeĐiallǇ ďǇ 
͞dǇiŶg.͟ OŶe has, then, to talk about spectrality. 
– Derrida 
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Introduction 
 Deƌƌida is hauŶted ďǇ Haŵlet͛s deĐlaƌatioŶ: ͚The tiŵe is out of joiŶt͛ ;Hamlet, 2.1.186). In his 
essay of the same title Derrida tells us:  
Hamlet in fact haunts the book I have just written, Specters of Marx. The phƌase ͞The tiŵe is 
out of joiŶt͟ is Đited, ƌeĐited, aŶalǇzed, aŶd also loǀed theƌe like aŶ oďsessioŶ. AŶd Ǉet, after 
the fact, I read it today differently 
(1995: 18) 
Deƌƌida͛s ǁƌitiŶgs oŶ Hamlet developed his understanding of spectrality, of an interior subjectivity 
and, in turn, of performativity. The influence of the play on him, and his love for it, he even admits 
heƌe as aŶ ͚oďsessioŶ͛. Deƌƌida also ƌeĐogŶises that despite his ƌepeated use of the phƌase ͚the tiŵe 
is out of joiŶt͛, it is speĐtƌal aŶd thus open to change. A spectre does not have to adhere to a linear 
construction of time, and is therefore anachronistic. Derrida notes the spectrality of Haŵlet͛s 
famous phrase, as even after his repeated use of it in Specters of Marx (1994), when he returns to 
use it again (giving it titular importance in his essay) already within the space of a year his reading of 
the term has changed. We often use words before having a full understanding of their meaning and 
it is not until later, when a new understanding is reached, that we can retrospectively recognise that 
the spectre was always already at work in those words before, without our awareness of it.  This is 
the anachronic experience of the spectral, which I will term spectral anachrony. This is precisely 
ǁhat Deƌƌida eǆpeƌieŶĐes ǁith his use of Haŵlet͛s phƌase: ͚The tiŵe is out of joiŶt͛ ;Hamlet, 
2.1.186). Derrida uses this phrase, by his own admission, obsessively in Specters of Marx in 1994, 
and yet it still takes on a different meaning when he comes to use it again in his essay the following 
year. In this essay Derrida suggests that:  
͞the tiŵe is out of joiŶt͟ [...] could also resonate secretly with that essential pathology of 
mourning. I have become aware of it too late; it is too late, for Specters of Marx, where the 
dis- or anachrony of mourning is in some way the very subject. This tragedy of dating has 
become apparent to me today, too late. 
(1995: 18) 
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Deƌƌida ƌepeatedlǇ tells us it is ͚too late͛ foƌ Specters of Marx to contain this realisation, but the 
anachronic spectre of mourning has alǁaǇs alƌeadǇ ďeeŶ pƌeseŶt iŶ this ďook, despite Deƌƌida͛s laĐk 
of acknowledgment of its being at work. As spectral anachrony allows us to realise, when we review 
Specters of Marx retrospectively this spectre can be seen to already have been at work. In Specters 
of Marx Deƌƌida ǁƌites: ͚Fiƌst of all, ŵouƌŶiŶg. We ǁill ďe speakiŶg of ŶothiŶg else.͛ ;ϭϵϵϰ: ϵͿ. This 
seems an odd statement to make. Derrida gives very little focus to the topic of mourning and after 
his brief mention of it here, on page 9, the word mourning is not used again until page 64. Yet 
Derrida states that he will be speaking of nothing but mourning. Herein is the spectre. The reason 
Deƌƌida ŵakes the gƌaŶd stateŵeŶt that, ͚ǁe ǁill ďe speakiŶg of ŶothiŶg else͛ ďut ŵouƌŶiŶg, is 
because mourning itself is temporally out of joint and does not adhere to a linear flow of time. One 
is always in mourning and so it is impossible to speak outside of mourning. Thus, Deƌƌida͛s toŶe of 
ƌegƌet iŶ ͚The Tiŵe is Out of JoiŶt͛ ;ϭϵϵϱͿ as he iŶsists it is ͚too late͛ for Specters of Marx to contain 
this understanding (that temporal disjointure is connected to mourning) is totally unnecessary, as by 
taking spectral anachrony into account and retrospectively analysing Specters of Marx with this in 
mind, it is possible to consider the ways in which Deƌƌida͛s ƌealisatioŶ ǁas alƌeadǇ pƌeseŶt ǁithiŶ the 
book, even without Derrida͛s kŶoǁledge of its presence.  
 Derrida is indebted to Hamlet for developing his philosophical ideas and, in turn, analysing 
Deƌƌida͛s ǁƌitiŶgs oŶ Hamlet reveals the fundamental connection between spectrality and 
anachrony. This connection has been largely overlooked by other commentators, and will be 
expanded upon in this thesis. As Hamlet proved to be such an inspiration to Derrida it will also form 
the basis of my analysis here. There are three different versions of Hamlet: the first quarto (Q1) was 
printed in 1603 and the following year a second quarto was published (Q2); the folio (F) was 
puďlished iŶ ϭϲϮϯ afteƌ “hakespeaƌe͛s death. This thesis ǁill Ƌuote fƌoŵ the seĐoŶd Ƌuaƌto as the 
fiƌst is iŶĐoŵplete aŶd is suspeĐted to ďe ͚ƌeĐoŶstƌuĐted by actors from perfoƌŵaŶĐes͛ ;Irace, 1998: 
ϭͿ. The folio is also iŶĐoŵplete as it is ͚a little shoƌteƌ thaŶ QϮ aŶd laĐks soŵe suďstaŶtial passages of 
QϮ͛s dialogue͛ ;ThoŵpsoŶ & TaǇloƌ, ϮϬϬϲ: ϵͿ. AlteƌŶatiǀelǇ, the seĐoŶd Ƌuaƌto, also kŶoǁŶ as ͚the 
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good quarto of 1604-5 [...] ǁas pƌiŶted fƌoŵ “hakespeaƌe͛s autogƌaph ĐopǇ͛ ;Gƌeg, ϭϵϱϰ: ϲϰͿ. As a 
result it will be the second quarto edition of Hamlet that is the foundational text which will be 
quoted from throughout this thesis. 
IŶ oƌdeƌ to eǆaŵiŶe Deƌƌida͛s ǁƌitiŶgs oŶ Hamlet it will also be necessary to have an 
understanding of his project that is to say, of deconstruction. Deconstruction is a term coined by 
Derrida that refers to his theoretical approach. It will be necessary to understand deconstruction in 
order to examine Derrida͛s ǁƌitiŶgs oŶ Hamlet: Derrida recognises that binary opposites are 
hierarchical and that one side is given a privileged status over the other. For example, in the binary 
of life and death, life is ascribed a superior status to death. Deconstruction allows us to consider the 
ways in which these binaries are not completely oppositional but in fact overlap, thus destabilising 
the binary and removing the bias that characterises it. It is important to understand that 
deconstruction is not a theoretical approach that can be applied to a text, but is an approach that 
considers the ways in which the binaries within the text are always already deconstructing 
themselves. A prime example of deconstruction in Hamlet would be the ghost of King Hamlet. The 
ghost is simultaneously alive and dead: the binary of life and death is deconstructed by the existence 
of the ghost as it holds properties of both; as a result neither side of this binary possesses a more 
significant status than the other.  
IŶ ϭϵϵϲ JeffƌeǇ Williaŵs ǁƌote aŶ aƌtiĐle eŶtitled ͚The Death of DeĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ, the EŶd of 
TheoƌǇ aŶd Otheƌ OŵiŶous ‘uŵouƌs͛, iŶ this he states that:  
By the late 80s and through the early 1990s [...] there was a rash of pronouncements 
proclaiming the death of deconstruction and announcing its passing from the critical scene.  
(1996: 17) 
My choice, therefore, to utilise ideas that lost popularity in the field of literary criticism at 
least two decades ago may seem an unusual one. Derrida, himself aware of the criticism levelled 
against his project, spoke of the death of deconstruction in the quote I have used as an epigraph to 
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this thesis. After writing about Hamlet as his overture to arguing for the continuation of Marxism in 
his book Specters of Marx, Derrida acknowledged the importance of spectrality and, indebted to 
Hamlet for reaching a better understanding of it, wrote another essay (which the epigraph is taken 
fƌoŵͿ eŶtitled ͚The Tiŵe is Out of JoiŶt͛ (1995). Even if the repeated assertions that deconstruction 
had died were true, Derrida stressed the importance of spectrality in arguing for the survival of that 
which is declared dead.  
Deconstruction will continue to exist as a spectre and even now, after the death of Jacques 
Derrida, the creator of deconstruction, and after the long-since declared death of his project of 
deconstruction, his philosophy remains influential upon the way in which we think. Not only does 
Derrida teach us of the importance of spectrality, as it allows us to comprehend the end, but he also 
begins to combine the spectre with anachrony and the disjointure of time. In Specters of Marx 
Derrida offers the following important statement:  
The disjointure in the very presence of the present, this sort of non-contemporaneity of 
present time with itself (this radical untimeliness or this anachrony [is] the basis [on] which 
we are trying here to think the ghost) 
(1994: 29) 
The spectre is always anachronic; it deconstructs a linear understanding of time and its presence can 
be deemed, retrospectively, to have already been at work. Within his parenthetical comment 
Derrida alludes to the necessity of understanding anachrony for it even to be possible to conceive a 
ghost or spectre. The spectral and the anachronic are inextricably linked. To be able to understand a 
spectre one must also understand that it does not adhere to a chronological flow of time. Although 
Derrida begins to recognise this necessary connection between the two, he never fully propounds 
the idea. In order to refer to this distinct connection, then, I propose to use the term spectral 
anachrony. It is impossible to recognise the work of a spectre in the present moment, but through a 
retrospective analysis, in view that the spectre is anachronic and that it has always already been at 
work, it is possible to recognise the functioning of a spectre.  
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 This thesis will take on four main topics of discussion, each of which will form a chapter; an 
analysis of spectral anachrony will be informative to each of these chapters. The first chapter will 
foĐus oŶ the ͚ǁoƌk of ŵouƌŶiŶg͛ ;Deƌƌida, ϭϵϵϲ: ϭϳϮͿ, as Deƌƌida also ƌeĐogŶises ͚the dis- or 
aŶaĐhƌoŶǇ of ŵouƌŶiŶg͛ ;ϭϵϵϱ: ϭϴͿ. Not oŶlǇ is speĐtƌalitǇ aŶaĐhƌoŶiĐ, but mourning is anachronic 
too, as Deƌƌida ďegaŶ to aĐkŶoǁledge iŶ his essaǇ ͚The Tiŵe is Out of JoiŶt͛ ;ϭϵϵ5). Part of the work 
of mourning requires the process of interiorisation and an examination of the spectral anachrony 
here will show that the spectre of an interior subjectivity is already at work in Shakespeare. By 
arguing this we will be able to answer the particularly baffling question as to why the ghost is visible 
to Hamlet but invisible to Gertrude later in the play, when it had previously been witnessed by 
Horatio, Barnardo and Marcellus. After chapter one has set the foundational understanding that 
Hamlet is continually working at the task of mourning, the second chapter will continue by analysing 
aŶotheƌ task that Haŵlet is asked to fulfil, ǁhiĐh is to aǀeŶge his fatheƌ͛s ŵuƌdeƌ. BǇ ƌefeƌƌiŶg to 
Deƌƌida͛s iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ of ǁhat the ghost asks of Haŵlet it will be possible to see how Derrida 
confuses revenge with justice. However, the proposition that – although he is only asked to attain 
revenge – Hamlet takes it upon himself to achieve a totalising form of justice that will be delivered 
to those who have committed murder by the close of the play, will reconcile Deƌƌida͛s 
misconception with my reading of Hamlet. In the third chapter I will return more specifically to the 
idea of spectrality and discuss it in relation to performativity. Derrida criticised AustiŶ͛s foƌŵulatioŶ 
of performativity in the 1970s, however, following his writings on Hamlet in the 1990s it becomes 
appaƌeŶt that Deƌƌida͛s uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of peƌfoƌŵatiǀitǇ has deǀeloped as a ƌesult of his 
understanding of spectrality. Consequently, his initial criticism of Austin for alluding to the necessity 
of an interior spirituality, in order to understand the performative, can be considered to be similar to 
his own later attempts to combine performativity with an understanding of spectrality. Austin and 
Deƌƌida͛s use of spiƌitualitǇ aŶd speĐtƌalitǇ shaƌe distinct similarities, yet they are subtly different 
and the third chapter will endeavour to make this distinction. In the final chapter, after discussing 
the spectral anachrony of an interior subjectivity, of justice and of the performative utterance, we 
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will consider how the protagonist, Hamlet himself, is spectral. The ghost of King Hamlet is readily 
accepted to be a ghost, but Prince Hamlet, following the task of vengeance the ghost has set him, no 
longer exists in the same way. Through spectral anachrony it is possible to retrospectively regard 
Prince Hamlet as a spectre, haunting the play until he has achieved that which has been asked of 
him. However, as we noted previously, Hamlet has taken it upon himself to do more than that which 
is asked of him. By the end of the play Hamlet achieves total justice against those who have 
committed murder, which also necessitates his own death, and with this his spectral presence in the 
play is no longer required and he can rest in peace.  
 Although the spectres in Hamlet may be laid to rest at the close of the play, through our 
retrospective analysis that takes into account the view of spectral anachrony, it is possible to bear 
witness to the multifarious ghosts that are in this play and to analyse the ways in which they are at 
ǁoƌk. BeĐause the dead aƌe Ŷot the depaƌted, the ghost of Haŵlet͛s fatheƌ is ƌeĐogŶisaďlǇ a speĐtƌal 
presence throughout the play, but more than this the spectre of deconstruction itself is at work 
ǁithiŶ this thesis aŶd, iŶdeďted to its pƌeseŶĐe, ǁe ĐaŶ see hoǁ Deƌƌida͛s philosophǇ ǁill ĐoŶtiŶue 
to survive in literary theory as long as people continue to think paradoxically.  
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Chapter 1: Haŵlet͛s CoŵpliĐated Woƌk of MouƌŶiŶg 
The death of King Hamlet, before the start of the play, is a pivotal event that marks the 
arrival of a spectre which continually haunts the Prince of Denmark, radically altering his purpose in 
life and his experience of existence. The death of his father leads Hamlet, not only into mourning, 
but into a melancholic disposition. IŶ his essaǇ ͚MouƌŶiŶg aŶd MelaŶĐholia͛ ;Fƌeud: ϭϵϭϳͿ the 
psǇĐhoaŶalǇst “igŵuŶd Fƌeud defiŶes these teƌŵs aŶd ďegiŶs to disĐuss ͚the ǁoƌk of ŵouƌŶiŶg͛ 
(1917: 245). This is a phrase that Derrida lateƌ takes up aŶd disĐusses iŶ aŶ essaǇ eŶtitled ͚BǇ FoƌĐe 
of MouƌŶiŶg͛ ;ϭϵϵϲͿ. An esseŶtial idea oŶe ŵust take fƌoŵ Deƌƌida͛s philosophǇ, ǁhiĐh ǁould 
oppose a FƌeudiaŶ ĐoŶĐeptioŶ, is that ͚all ǁoƌk is also the ǁoƌk of ŵouƌŶiŶg͛ ;Deƌƌida, ϭϵϵϲ: ϭϳϮͿ. 
Mourning is laborious and Hamlet is absorbed in this occupation.  
Moreover, not only is mourning influential for Hamlet, but so is death itself. Death is a 
spectral presence in the play and it is one which deconstructs time; considering this interrelationship 
between death and time will allow for the application of my term spectral anachrony, which will be 
applied to Hamlet in this chapter. Inextricably linked to the work of mourning is the process of 
interiorisation. Following a death, the bereaved have to accept that the dead now only continue to 
exist from within them. The term interiorisation characterises this understanding of the transition of 
the dead from an external, corporeal existence, to an internal and cerebral one. Interestingly, this 
discussion of interiorising the dead, and of an interior subjectivity in Hamlet more broadly, reveals 
the instability in philosophical thought at the time as ideas were shifting from objectivity to 
subjectivity in the sense outlined, after Hamlet was first performed, by Descartes. For Hamlet, this 
process of interiorisation is interrupted by the ghost of his father. The arrival of the spectre confuses 
Hamlet, as he is unable to ontologically discern the remains of his father and this also instils him with 
doubt, thus complicating his work of mourning. The ghost is both the catalyst that incites Hamlet to 
act, as well as the perplexing absent presence that encumbers Hamlet, as he spends a lot his time 
trying to comprehend the spectral continuation of his father and the nature of existence itself.  
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In addition to considering death with relation to spectrality, another enlightening way to 
ĐoŵpƌeheŶd death is ǁith ƌefeƌeŶĐe to sileŶĐe. AŶ eǆaŵiŶatioŶ of Haŵlet͛s fiŶal ǁoƌds iŶ the plaǇ 
will inform the final discussion in this chapter. BǇ eǆploƌiŶg Deƌƌida͛s ǁƌitiŶgs oŶ Hamlet and 
conceiving the play from the position of spectrality it will be possible to observe the anachrony of 
Shakespeare experimenting with ideas of interiority, not as simply paradoxical, but as an innovative 
development that contributes to the philosophical comprehension of suďjeĐtiǀitǇ. Haŵlet͛s 
complicated work of mourning provides Shakespeare with an unstable and thus mutable basis from 
which to trial out these developing issues of interiority.   
Hamlet is both in mourning for his father and melancholic as a result of his death. Although 
these terms are closely related they are distinct from one another; Freud notes the connection and 
distiŶguishes the teƌŵs iŶ his teǆt ͚MouƌŶiŶg aŶd MelaŶĐholia͛ ;ϭϵϭϳͿ. Befoƌe offeƌiŶg Fƌeud͛s 
definition of melancholy it is fiƌst ŶeĐessaƌǇ to outliŶe a ďƌief etǇŵologǇ of ͚ŵelaŶĐholǇ͛, as the 
understanding of the term in the Renaissance era was different to our current conception that has 
been developed as a result of Freud. In the renaissance era melancholia would have been associated 
with humoral theory as melancholy was the symptom of black bile.1 Haŵlet͛s ͚iŶkǇ Đloak͛ ;Hamlet, 
1.2.77) and the ritual of wearing black when in mourning is connected to melancholy through 
huŵoƌal theoƌǇ aŶd its affiliatioŶ ǁith ďlaĐk ďile, heŶĐe Haŵlet͛s eǆteŶded peƌiod of dƌessiŶg iŶ 
black would have symbolically presented his melancholy to a contemporary audience, who would 
have been aware of humoral theory. Both mourning and melancholy are a reaction to loss, but, 
unlike mourning, melancholy results in the loss of ego. Freud offers the following definition of 
melancholy:  
The distinguishing mental features of melancholia are a profoundly painful dejection, 
cessation of interest in the outside world, loss of the capacity to love, inhibition of all 
activity, and a lowering of the self-regarding feelings to a degree that finds utterance in self-
reproaches 
                                                          
1 Foƌ aŶ outliŶe of the ‘eŶaissaŶĐe huŵoƌal theoƌǇ see ͚History of Psychiatry and Medical Psychology: With an 
Epilogue on Psychiatry and the Mind-Body ‘elatioŶ͛ ďǇ “taŶleǇ W. JaĐksoŶ page ϰϰϰ. 
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 (1917: 244) 
This definition ďeaƌs a stƌoŶg ĐoŵpaƌisoŶ to Haŵlet͛s speeĐh iŶ AĐt Ϯ sĐeŶe Ϯ: 
I have of late, but wherefore I know not, lost all my mirth, foregone all custom of exercises 
and, indeed, it goes so heavily with my disposition that this goodly frame the earth seems to 
me a sterile promontory  
(Hamlet, 2.2.261-265)  
Although this quotation from Hamlet reveals the features of dejection and inactivity that Freud 
outlines as symptomatic of melancholy, these features are also perceptible in people who are in 
ŵouƌŶiŶg. It is the ͚self-ƌepƌoaĐhes͛ that Fƌeud ƌefeƌs to that distiŶguish ŵelaŶĐholǇ fƌoŵ ŵouƌŶiŶg, 
and this is precisely what we see in Hamlet, who reprimands himself with: ͚O, ǁhat a ƌogue and 
peasaŶt slaǀe aŵ I!͛ ;Hamlet, Ϯ.Ϯ.ϰϴϱͿ aŶd ͚WhǇ, ǁhat aŶ ass aŵ I͛ ;Hamlet, 2.2.517). Presenting 
Fƌeud͛s defiŶitioŶs ĐoŵpaƌatiǀelǇ ǁith Haŵlet͛s speeĐh iŶ AĐt Ϯ sĐeŶe Ϯ eǆposes Haŵlet as aŶ 
archetypal example of the Freudian melancholic man. In his speech, Hamlet diagnoses himself with 
melancholia; he is self-aware of his disposition, but even with this knowledge he is unable to alter his 
feelings, as Hamlet is in a perpetual melancholic state of mourning.  
 Deƌƌida͛s essaǇ ͚BǇ FoƌĐe of MouƌŶiŶg͛ ;ϭϵϳϴͿ outlines some of his key philosophies on 
ŵouƌŶiŶg aŶd also offeƌs a ĐƌitiƋue of the ideas Fƌeud pƌoposes iŶ ͚MouƌŶiŶg aŶd MelaŶĐholia͛ 
(1917). One of the major points on which Freud and Derrida disagree is on the period of time in 
which to grieve. The term of mourning is of concern, not only on a critical level, but also on a 
diegetic level as Claudius and Hamlet disagree over the correct length of time in which it is necessary 
to mourn. Claudius lectures Hamlet with the following:  
your father lost a father,  
That father lost lost his, and the survivor bound 
In filial obligation for some term 
To do obsequious sorrow; but to persever 
In obstinate condolement is a course 
Of iŵpious stuďďoƌŶŶess, ͚tis uŶŵaŶlǇ gƌief, 
(Hamlet, 1.2.89-94)  
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Claudius suggests here that there is a fixed term which mourning must be constrained to and 
encourages Hamlet to bring the time for mourning his father to an end. Like Claudius, Freud sees 
ŵouƌŶiŶg as soŵethiŶg that has a fiǆed teƌŵ: ͚ǁheŶ the ǁoƌk of ŵouƌŶiŶg is Đoŵpleted the ego 
ďeĐoŵes fƌee aŶd uŶiŶhiďited agaiŶ͛ ;Fƌeud, ϭϵϭϳ: ϮϰϱͿ. Claudius ǁishes Haŵlet to Đoŵplete his 
work of mourning as soon as possible and in order to speed along the process he points out the 
commonality of death and faces him with the fleeting nature of mortality. 
Deƌƌida aŶalǇses Claudius͛ addƌess iŶ his essaǇ ͚The Tiŵe is Out of JoiŶt͛ ;ϭϵϵϱͿ, iŶfoƌŵiŶg us 
that Claudius eǆhoƌts Haŵlet to ͚put a term to his grief, to comprehend his mourning, to 
ĐoŵpƌeheŶd it ďetǁeeŶ tǁo dates, the ďegiŶŶiŶg aŶd the eŶd,͛ (1995: 2). Nonetheless, Hamlet can 
neither comprehend his mourning nor set a fixed term to it. IŶ his ĐƌitiƋue of ͚MouƌŶiŶg aŶd 
MelaŶĐholia͛ ;Fƌeud, ϭϵϭϳͿ Deƌƌida offeƌs the folloǁiŶg stateŵeŶt ǁhiĐh deeplǇ opposes Fƌeud: 
[...]  all work is also the work of mourning [...] whoever thus works at the work of mourning 
learns the impossible – and that mourning is interminable. 
(Derrida, 1996: 172) 
For Derrida as for Hamlet himself, mourning is a process in continual occurrence. The term of 
mourning has no beginning and has no end; instead they exist simultaneously as Derrida suggests in 
͚FoƌĐe aŶd “igŶifiĐatioŶ͛ ;Deƌƌida, ϭϵϳϴͿ ǁheŶ he ƌefeƌs to the ͚iŵpliĐatioŶ of the eŶd iŶ the 
ďegiŶŶiŶg͛ ;ϭϵϳϴ: ϮϱͿ. It is impossible for Hamlet to comprehend his term of mourning between two 
dates. Claudius saǇs that the suƌǀiǀoƌ is ďouŶd ͚To do oďseƋuious soƌƌoǁ͛. Hoǁeǀeƌ, soƌƌoǁ aŶd in 
particular mourning is not an act that can be performed and completed, it is not something to do, 
but in a Derridean sense, is something to be. Mourning is a state of BeiŶg. Deƌƌida͛s iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ 
that mourning has no beginning and has no end is a point which he and Freud disagree on, as can be 
Ŷoted ǁheŶ ĐoŶtƌastiŶg theiƌ ǀieǁs oŶ ǁheŶ ŵouƌŶiŶg ĐoŵŵeŶĐes. IŶ ͚MouƌŶiŶg aŶd MelaŶĐholǇ͛ 
Freud says that mourning is ͚ƌegulaƌlǇ the ƌeaĐtioŶ to the loss of a loǀed peƌsoŶ͛ ;Fƌeud, ϭϵϭϳ: ϮϰϯͿ, 
ďut ĐoŶtƌastiŶglǇ foƌ Deƌƌida ŵouƌŶiŶg is ͚pƌepaƌed͛ aŶd is that ǁhiĐh ͚ǁe eǆpeĐt fƌoŵ the ďegiŶŶiŶg 
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to folloǁ upoŶ the death of those ǁe loǀe͛ ;Deƌƌida, ϭϵϵϲ: ϭϳ6). Not only is mourning interminable 
in the sense that it has no finality but more so because it has no set commencement either. 
Deƌƌida͛s philosophǇ that ŵouƌŶiŶg is peƌpetual ĐoŶtƌadiĐts the FƌeudiaŶ ŶotioŶ that ŵouƌŶiŶg ĐaŶ 
be completed. Derrida also deconstructs time: as the term to mourning has no fixed end or 
beginning, the past co-exists with the present and future certainties, such as death, also impinge 
upon the present, resulting in an anachronic understanding of time as a result of mourning. 
Befoƌe ƌeaĐhiŶg the uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg that ŵouƌŶiŶg is ͚iŶteƌŵiŶaďle͛, Deƌƌida disĐussed, ǁhat 
he termed, the ͚aŶaĐhƌoŶǇ of ŵouƌŶiŶg͛ ;Deƌƌida, ϭϵϵϱ: ϭϴͿ. This conception, that mourning negates 
a linear understanding of time, is something that Hamlet himself recognises within the play. 
FolloǁiŶg his eŶĐouŶteƌ ǁith the ghost Haŵlet deĐlaƌes to his fƌieŶds: ͚The tiŵe is out of joiŶt; O 
cursed spite/ That eǀeƌ I ǁas ďoƌŶ to set it ƌight!͛ (Hamlet, 2.1.186-187). With this declaration 
Hamlet captures the notion that mourning and the spectre of death are atemporal, time has become 
disjointed and unhinged. Embedded within every instant of existence is the inevitability of death and 
Hamlet in his melancholia is all too aware of this.  
Through the death of his father Hamlet has begun to philosophise over death and this 
ŵoƌďid fiǆatioŶ has left hiŵ, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to NietzsĐhe, loŶgiŶg ͚foƌ a ǁoƌld ďeǇoŶd death͛ ;NietzsĐhe, 
ϭϵϵϵ: ϰϬͿ. NietzsĐhe aƌgues that Haŵlet has ͚gazed iŶto the tƌue esseŶĐe of thiŶgs͛ ;NietzsĐhe, 1999: 
40) through the process of his work of mourning and has thus discovered the wisdom of Silenus, that 
it is ďetteƌ to ͚Ŷot haǀe ďeeŶ ďoƌŶ, Ŷot to be, to be nothing͛ ;NietzsĐhe, ϭϵϵϵ: ϮϯͿ. IŶ NietzsĐhe͛s 
view Hamlet longs for death and this is an acquisition of true knowledge. However, for Derrida there 
is Ŷo fiǆed tƌuth to ďe attaiŶed aŶd Haŵlet͛s fasĐiŶatioŶ ǁith death is Ŷot a death ǁish, ďut a Ŷatuƌal 
consideration as a result of contemplating the anachrony that life is haunted by the inescapability of 
death.  
Shakespeare adds further significance to this exploration of atemporality by placing the 
pivotal event – the death of King Hamlet – which the subsequent actions of the play depend upon, 
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before the start of the play. In the way that mourning is interminable, as it is something that is done 
before, during and after death; death itself is a spectre that is similarly anachronic. Death is an 
imminent part of existence. The conditions for the possibility of life necessitate death, it is 
impossible to haǀe oŶe ǁithout the otheƌ; oƌ iŶ Geƌtƌude͛s ǁoƌds: ͚Thou kŶoǁst ͚tis ĐoŵŵoŶ all that 
liǀes ŵust die,͛ ;Hamlet, 1.2.72).Through carrying out the work of mourning for his father Hamlet is 
faced with his own mortality and begins to question the nature of existence. Death is a haunting 
figure throughout the play that does more than simply occur in the final scene in order to bring 
about a resolution. As I earlier noted in the epigraph to this thesis, Derrida advises us that:  
[...] one must stop believing that the dead are just the departed and that the departed do 
ŶothiŶg. OŶe ŵust stop pƌeteŶdiŶg to kŶoǁ ǁhat is ŵeaŶt ďǇ ͞to die͟ aŶd espeĐiallǇ ďǇ 
͞dǇiŶg͟. OŶe has, theŶ, to talk aďout speĐtƌalitǇ. 
(1995: 30) 
Death is a spectral presence in life and the living are continually haunted by the dead and by the 
concept of death itself. When in mourning the bereaved are not only faced with the absolute alterity 
of the dead and the task of accepting that they are no longer a part of the living world, but must also 
accept that the dead continue to haunt the living. The dead endure within memory after death and 
the memory of the dead spectrally remains. The all-important work of mourning has to comprehend 
this paradox: the dead are the absolute other that has ceased to exist and the spectre that continues 
to exist. 
 However, the spectre of death haunts Hamlet not only in memory throughout the play, but 
is apparent physically and externally as the ghost of King Hamlet returns to converse with Hamlet in 
Act 1 scene 5. In Hamlet the dead are far more than the departed, the dead king is a spectre, which 
begins by coming back and works to bring about changes in the state through inciting Hamlet to 
action. In Hamlet the death moves as a spectre which recurrently leaves and returns: the ghost can 
come and go as it pleases and upon its visitations it acts as a memento mori, reminding Hamlet of his 
own imminent death. Although the physical embodiment of the spectre as a ghost can come and go, 
17 | P a g e  
 
moreover, there is the spectre of death itself which has a constant presence. As we have already 
noted the spectre is anachronic and does not have to adhere to a chronological flow of time. Hamlet 
pƌeseŶts his ŵotheƌ ǁith a poƌtƌait of his fatheƌ aŶd desĐƌiďes his fatheƌ as ͚the fƌoŶt of Joǀe hiŵself͛ 
ǁith aŶ ͚eǇe like Maƌs to thƌeateŶ aŶd ĐoŵŵaŶd,͛ ;Hamlet, 3.4.54-55). This portrait, produced while 
his father was alive, is used here after his death to recollect his greatness, but note the spectral 
anachrony of this; in retrospect that portrait captured an image of a man that has survived him 
following his death. The spectre of death is already at work, even before the subject of the picture 
has died. The death of King Hamlet may be the pivotal event that marks the arrival of the spectre, 
but upon reflection the spectre was always already at work even before his death. The term spectral 
anachrony captures this essence of the atemporality of the spectre.  
 In Hamlet the spectre of death is not only an external presence, as in the case of the ghost, 
but is also an internal presence. An integral part of the work of mourning is the process of 
interiorisation. In the iŶtƌoduĐtoƌǇ essaǇ ͚To ‘eĐkoŶ ǁith the Dead: JaĐƋues Deƌƌida͛s PolitiĐs of 
MouƌŶiŶg͛ Brault & Naas explain that:  
In mourning, we must reĐogŶize that the fƌieŶd is Ŷoǁ ďoth oŶlǇ ͞iŶ us͟ aŶd alƌeadǇ ďeǇoŶd 
us, in us but totally other, so that nothing we say of or to them can touch them in their 
infinite alterity. 
(2001: 11) 
To be able to come to terms with death those in mourning must accept that the dead continue to 
exist only within them, the living. After death the dead ƌeŵaiŶ as ͚the otheƌ iŶ us͛ ;Deƌƌida, ϭϵϵϱ: ϮϬͿ 
and they continue to exist from within those who live on.  
Those in mourning must work at this interiorisation by coming to terms with the new found 
interiority of a loved one. Following the death of his father Hamlet must try to comprehend that his 
father exists within him and accept the constant presence of his dead father. Hamlet is alive and 
dead in various senses. Both King Hamlet and Prince Hamlet remarkably share the same name and 
Hamlet the father has died, whilst Hamlet the son remains alive. However, the dead father returns 
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as a ghost to the realm of the living, deconstructing the opposition between life and death. Also, 
Hamlet the son has to interiorise his dead father and as a living Being must accept the dead, and 
death, within him. Hamlet, the father and the son, in being confronted with death (physically for the 
king and mentally for the prince) are in a position that situates them in an uneasy place somewhere 
between life and death.  
When explaining why he is still dressed in black to Gertrude and Claudius, Hamlet offers the 
folloǁiŶg heƌoiĐ ƌhǇŵiŶg Đouplet: ͚But I haǀe that ǁithiŶ ǁhiĐh passes shoǁ,/ These but the 
tƌappiŶgs aŶd the suits of ǁoe͛ ;Hamlet, 1.2.85-86). Hamlet argues that his outward apparel of grief 
ĐaŶŶot eǆpƌess his iŶŶeƌ thoughts aŶd feeliŶgs. This has led ĐƌitiĐ FƌaŶĐis Baƌkeƌ to Ŷote that ͚aŶ 
iŶteƌioƌ suďjeĐtiǀitǇ ďegiŶs to speak heƌe͛ ;ϭϵϵϱ: 32). Hamlet refers to his possession of an inward 
consciousness which cannot be presented externally. Hoǁeǀeƌ, Baƌkeƌ aƌgues that this ͚iŶteƌioƌitǇ 
remains, in Hamlet, gestuƌal͛ ;ϭϵϵϱ: ϯϮͿ ďeĐause the disĐussioŶ of suďjeĐtiǀitǇ iŶ Hamlet is 
͚aŶaĐhƌoŶistiĐ aŶd [ďeloŶgs] to a histoƌiĐal oƌdeƌ ǁhose outliŶe has so faƌ oŶlǇ ďeeŶ sketĐhed out͛ 
(Barker, 1995: 33). The conceptualisation of an interior subjectivity, which Descartes outlines not 
long after the first performance of Hamlet, is already being explored by Shakespeare and as a result 
of this anachrony Barker disŵisses Haŵlet͛s reference as merely gestural. To add to this discussion 
NiĐk Daǀis states that: ͚Haŵlet͛s Đlaiŵ to haǀe ͚that ǁithiŶ ǁhiĐh passes shoǁ͛ Đould Ŷot ĐoŶĐeiǀaďlǇ 
signal a temporally defined moment of concerted cultural change, because there was no such 
moment͛ ;ϮϬϭϯ: ϱͿ. Although there is no singular moment that can be credited as the foundation of 
the ĐoŶĐept of aŶ iŶteƌioƌ suďjeĐtiǀitǇ, ǁe should Ŷot disŵiss Haŵlet͛s allusioŶ to it heƌe as simply a 
gesture on the grounds that it is anachronistic. Instead the spectral anachrony of an interior 
subjectivity in Hamlet should be welcomed. Shakespeare anticipates the arrival of subjectivity in 
Hamlet as the iŶĐoŶsisteŶĐǇ of the ghost͛s pƌeseŶce and absence, visibility and invisibility, plays out 
this unstable binary between objectivity and subjectivity, at a time when the conception of an 
interior subjectivity is yet to be fully developed. It is only by assessing Hamlet retrospectively, with 
19 | P a g e  
 
an understanding of Cartesian subjectivity, that the spectral anachrony can be recognised and the 
spectral presence of interiority can be brought to light.  
Another way in which Shakespeare acts out this issue of interiorisation in Hamlet is through 
the interplay of the external and the internal. When Hamlet visits his mother to chastise her for 
marrying his uncle, the ghost of the dead king returns to remind Hamlet of the task of revenge he 
has set him. Although Hamlet can see the ghost, Gertrude cannot. The ghost is simultaneously visible 
and invisible, as it is a spectre that deconstructs binary oppositions such as: life/death, 
presence/absence, as well as deconstructing a linear, chronological understanding of time. However, 
more importantly the shift from an externally present ghost that is seen by multiple witnesses 
(including Horatio, Barnardo and Marcellus), to an invisible and internal ghost, that exists only in 
Haŵlet͛s ŵiŶd aŶd is thus iŶǀisiďle to Geƌtƌude, ŵaƌks the ǁoƌkiŶgs of the speĐtƌe of subjectivity 
and tracks the move in our cultural understanding of interiority as the idea is being developed here 
by Shakespeare. IŶ otheƌ ǁoƌds, “hakespeaƌe͛s iŶĐoŶsisteŶĐǇ iŶ pƌeseŶtiŶg the ghost eǆteƌŶallǇ 
earlier in the play and internally later in the play, is not a flaw on the part of the playwright, but is a 
reflection on the way the philosophical understanding of subjectivity was unstable but beginning to 
be developed at that time.  
Although we have discussed the necessity to understand the interiority of the dead within 
the living during the work of mourning, it is apparent that the ghost of King Hamlet raises 
ĐoŵpliĐatioŶs iŶ this pƌoĐess of iŶteƌioƌisatioŶ, ǁhiĐh has ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes foƌ Haŵlet͛s ǁoƌk of 
mourning as a whole. In relation to a discussion of the ghost in Hamlet, Derrida states that mourning 
͚alǁaǇs ĐoŶsists iŶ atteŵptiŶg to oŶtologize ƌeŵaiŶs [...] nothing could be worse, for the work of 
mourning, than confusion or doubt͛ (Derrida, 1994: 9). Which Derrida directly notes in Hamlet:  
[...] one must indeed know at what moment death took place, and this is always the 
moment of a murder. But Hamlet, and everyone in Hamlet, seems to be wandering around 
in confusion on this subject. 
 (1995: 20-21) 
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It is this worst-case scenario of confusion and doubt that Hamlet encounters as a result of the 
ghostly return of his father. The death and ghostly reappearance of his father leads Hamlet into a 
positioŶ of oŶtologiĐal uŶĐeƌtaiŶtǇ as he ĐaŶŶot loĐate his fatheƌ͛s ƌeŵaiŶs. Before Hamlet is even 
aware of the ghostlǇ appeaƌaŶĐes fƌoŵ his fatheƌ he saǇs to Hoƌatio ͚MǇ fatheƌ, ŵethiŶks I see ŵǇ 
fatheƌ͛ aŶd ǁheŶ Hoƌatio asks ǁheƌe, Haŵlet ƌeplies ͚IŶ ŵǇ ŵiŶd͛s eǇe,͛ ;Hamlet, 1.2.183, 184). 
Hamlet is already haunted by the spectre of mourning, but seeing the ghost itself further confuses 
Hamlet by making him question his understanding of reality, as well as leading him to question the 
entirety of his knowledge.  
As a result of his encounter with the ghost Hamlet is left, not only with ontological 
confusion, but with epistemological doubt. The presence of the ghost removes Hamlet͛s ĐeƌtaiŶtǇ iŶ 
the nature of Being. But, in denying his usual understanding of existence, the ghost also makes 
Hamlet question knowledge itself. If Hamlet cannot even understand where the remains of his 
father lie, then he is no longer able to trust in that which he presumes he already knows. The 
eŶtiƌetǇ of Haŵlet͛s kŶoǁledge is ďƌought iŶto ƋuestioŶ aŶd duƌiŶg the eŶĐouŶteƌ ǁith the ghost 
Hamlet alludes to wiping clean his memory to start again, now with this new found discovery of the 
other-ǁoƌldlǇ: ͚Yea, fƌoŵ the taďle of ŵǇ ŵeŵoƌǇ/ I͛ll ǁipe aǁaǇ all tƌiǀial foŶd ƌeĐoƌds [...] And thy 
ĐoŵŵaŶdŵeŶt all aloŶe shall liǀe/ WithiŶ the ďook aŶd ǀoluŵe of ŵǇ ďƌaiŶ͛ ;Hamlet, 1.5.98-99,102-
103). Although this passage is often cited with regards to revenge, as Hamlet is here promising to 
eǆaĐt the task of ǀeŶgeaŶĐe he has ďeeŶ set, it is eǀideŶt fƌoŵ Haŵlet͛s aĐtual defeƌŵeŶt fƌoŵ 
action following this scene that he does not really intend to hastily carry out this duty. Instead, the 
sĐholaƌlǇ ŵetaphoƌ ƌeǀeals Haŵlet͛s ĐoŶĐeƌŶ ǁith kŶoǁledge, as the ǀisitatioŶ of the ghost has 
foƌĐed Haŵlet to ƋuestioŶ ǁhat he kŶoǁs aŶd ďelieǀes to ďe tƌue. Haŵlet͛s ǁoƌk of ŵouƌŶiŶg is 
already an impossible task, as it is – as Derrida noted – interminable. Notwithstanding this, the 
aƌƌiǀal of the ghost adds fuƌtheƌ ĐoŵpleǆitǇ to Haŵlet͛s work of mourning as it also casts Hamlet 
into confusion and doubt.  
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Death in Hamlet is conceptualised in terms of silence. The work of mourning requires the 
bereaved to comprehend the unerring silence of death. After the loss of a loved one those left 
behind are unable to communicate with the dead as they now exist only from within the living. 
Derrida concludes his eulogistic essay dedicated to Foucault in The Work of Mourning with an 
iŶĐlusiǀe ƌefeƌeŶĐe to his ŵouƌŶeƌs ďǇ ƌeĐogŶisiŶg ͚the aďsolute sileŶĐe ǁheƌe ǁe ƌeŵaiŶ͛ ;Deƌƌida, 
2001: 90). One of the major difficulties we face in mourning is the oppressive silence of death and 
accepting that thoughts and feelings can no longer be shared with the departed. Derrida also 
laŵeŶts iŶ ͚BǇ FoƌĐe of MouƌŶiŶg͛ soŵethiŶg he teƌŵs ͚the suƌǀiǀal effeĐt, the effeĐt of liǀiŶg oŶ͛ 
(1996: 186). While the dead are infinitely othered by their, silence the living are expected to use 
their voice to articulate the silence in which they remain in the face of death. The living must 
continue to live and to speak in the face of the silent dead. However, in Hamlet the dead do speak. 
As a result of this, Haŵlet, iŶstead of speakiŶg foƌ the dead, falls sileŶt: ͚Haŵlet glimpsed [entrevu] 
such a terrifying thing, the Thing itself, that he decides to make no further move: he will remain but 
a disĐouƌaged ǁitŶess, paƌalǇzed, sileŶt͛ ;Deƌƌida, ϭϵϵϱ: ϯϱͿ.  
Hamlet feels the weight of the survival effect after the death of his father as he must 
continue to live in very different circumstances, where his uncle has usurped his father and himself. 
Although death is perceived as silence and the living the speaking survivors, once again the ghost 
complicates this understanding as the ghost has a voice and breaks the silence of death. We can 
specify, therefore, that the silence that is associated with death in Hamlet does not refer to death 
alone, but peaceful death. The sileŶt dead aƌe those that aƌe at ƌest, the ͚peƌtuƌďed spiƌit͛ ;Hamlet, 
1.5.180Ϳ of Haŵlet͛s fatheƌ ĐaŶ speak ďeĐause, despite being dead, he is not able to rest. It is 
Haŵlet͛s dutǇ to eǆaĐt ǀeŶgeaŶĐe upoŶ his fatheƌ͛s ŵuƌdeƌeƌ aŶd oŶĐe this has ďeeŶ Đaƌƌied out the 
ghost of his father will be at peace and able to attain the customary silent death-state. Haŵlet͛s fiŶal 
words in the play are: ͚The ƌest is sileŶĐe͛ ;Hamlet, 5.2.342). This pertains to the peaceful resolution 
of the play after the bloody and violent dramatic closure, as well as to his own amity in his final 
ŵoŵeŶts. The ǁoƌd ͚ƌest͛ is also sigŶifiĐaŶt, in that it can be understood as ͚the ƌest͛, as iŶ the 
22 | P a g e  
 
remainder, ďut to ƌest as iŶ to pause aŶd ƌelaǆ. ͚The ƌest is sileŶĐe͛ theƌefoƌe ĐaŶ ďe uŶdeƌstood to 
mean either that, following his death, all that will remain is silence, or, that his restful death will be 
peaceful and he will have no need to return, as his father did, as a ghost. 
Haŵlet͛s ǁoƌk of ŵouƌŶiŶg is a ĐoŵpliĐated pƌoĐess aŶd his deliďeƌatioŶ oǀeƌ life aŶd death 
as a result of this leads Hamlet to begin to, anachronically, contemplate subjectivity. One of the 
reasons Haŵlet͛s ŵouƌŶiŶg is ŵoƌe Đoŵpleǆ is due to his ŵelaŶĐholia. Hamlet has lost his own ego 
and reproaches himself for not acting upon the command his father has set him to take revenge. 
Haŵlet is a ĐlassiĐ ŵodel of Fƌeud͛s defiŶitioŶ of ŵelaŶĐholǇ. Hoǁeǀeƌ, Fƌeud͛s conception of 
mourning fundamentally conflicts with the view of Jacques Derrida. Freud perceives the work of 
mourning as something that can be completed, whereas Derrida argues that it is a continual process 
that is always at work and can never be completed. In this sense, mourning is atemporal as it is not 
something that has a beginning and an end, but something that has always already begun and that 
will Ŷeǀeƌ eŶd. Haŵlet͛s phƌase: ͚The tiŵe is out of joiŶt͛ (Hamlet, 1.5.186) is a phrase which 
captures this atemporality, or anachrony, and is something Derrida returns to discuss in his 
informative essay with the same title, in which he describes mourning as anachronic. In his writing, 
Derrida (unlike Freud) fails to make the distinction between mourning and melancholy, instead 
choosing only to discuss mourning. 
The time of mourning is not the only thing that acts anachronically, the spectrality of the 
ghost also deconstructs the linear flow of time. My term spectral anachrony ĐoŵďiŶes Deƌƌida͛s 
conception of spectrality with anachrony in order to show how the two are interrelated, as the 
spectre is anachronic it is possible to retrospectively shed light on a spectre by showing how it has 
already been at work. This can be applied to the poƌtƌait of Haŵlet͛s fatheƌ, ǁheƌe the spectre of 
death was already at work in the image, even before the death of the king. However, the presence 
of the spectre can only be understood in retrospect. Death spectrally haunts the living. Yet, not only 
is the anachrony of the spectre of death at work in Hamlet, but so is the anachronic spectre of 
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subjectivity. Hamlet is influenced by the idea of an interior subjectivity that is developing at the time 
but is not yet fully formed. Despite the fact that subjectivity has not yet been fully understood, 
Haŵlet aŶtiĐipates its aƌƌiǀal ǁheŶ he deĐlaƌes ͚I haǀe that ǁithiŶ ǁhiĐh passes shoǁ͛ (Hamlet, 
1.2.85). As Shakespeare plays with the developing issue of interiority he chooses to make the ghost 
visible to all initiallǇ, ďut lateƌ the ghost eǆists oŶlǇ iŶ Haŵlet͛s ŵiŶd. This iŶĐoŶsisteŶĐǇ Đoŵes aďout 
as a ƌesult of “hakespeaƌe͛s eǆpeƌiŵeŶtatioŶ ǁith the idea of aŶ iŶteƌioƌ suďjeĐtivity that is yet to be 
fully formed. 
In summary, Hamlet is continually in mourning throughout the play. Even when it is not 
always apparent, the spectre of mourning is always at work as a foundational factor in constructing 
Haŵlet͛s dispositioŶ. Derrida reminds us:  
[...] this is the law, the law of mourning, and the law of the law, always in mourning, that it 
would have to fail in order to succeed. 
(Derrida, 1996: 173) 
FiƌstlǇ, ǁith ƌegaƌds to ŵouƌŶiŶg ǁe haǀe alƌeadǇ Ŷoted that ͚all ǁoƌk is the ǁoƌk of ŵouƌŶiŶg͛ 
(Derrida, 1996: 172) and unlike Freud, who suggested that the work of mourning can be completed, 
ǁe ƌealised fƌoŵ Deƌƌida͛s peƌspeĐtiǀe that ŵouƌŶiŶg is ͚iŶteƌŵiŶaďle͛ ;ϭϵϵϲ: ϭϳϮͿ, thus to ďe 
successful at the work of mourning one must fail to achieve this final point of completion where 
mourning is no more. It is only through a failure to complete the work of mourning that one has 
found what it means to mourn. Similarly, this logic of failure as a determining factor for success can 
be applied to justice and will be a central philosophy to the following chapter that focuses on 
Hamlet͛s quest to attain justice for his father. Haŵlet͛s ƌepeated failuƌe to take ƌeǀeŶge is a 
necessary part of his mission to attain justice and his failure to succeed is a condition of his eventual 
success in attaining justice at the end of the play.  
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Chapter 2: The Quest for Justice 
IŶ ͚FoƌĐe of Laǁ͛ Derrida claimed that: ͚DeĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ is justiĐe͛ ;Deƌƌida, ϭϵϵϮ: ϭϱͿ. Derrida 
continues his exploration of justice, as something which is both distinct from the law and dependent 
upon deconstruction for its actualisation, in his writings on Hamlet. In the exordium to Specters of 
Marx Derrida writes:  
No justice [...] seems possible or thinkable without the principle of some responsibility, 
beyond all living present, before the ghosts of those who are not yet born or who are 
already dead, 
(1994: xviii) 
In writing this book Derrida was taking up a political responsibility and attempting to do justice to 
Marxism in arguing for its spectral continuation. It is interesting therefore that from the 
commencement of this ǁoƌk Deƌƌida ƌetuƌŶs to “hakespeaƌe͛s Hamlet, a play where not only the 
issue of spectrality is apparent and open to investigation, but a play where the protagonist takes 
upon himself the responsibility of delivering justice for the other. Hamlet is a revenge tragedy that 
moves beyond the constraints of an ideology of vengeance to consider instead the possibility of 
justice. By the close of the play Hamlet does achieve total justice against those who have committed 
murder, as well as dispensing a form of justice wherein all those who are guilty are fittingly punished 
as a means to set the state right. In order for Hamlet to rectify the corrupt state, the way in which 
the dƌaŵatis peƌsoŶae die is esseŶtial to Haŵlet͛s unremitting mission to attain justice.  
While Hamlet proves to be a useful text for Derrida to begin to discuss spectrality, it 
becomes more than this as, quite appropriately, Hamlet haunts Derrida and he continued to write 
on the play his essaǇ eŶtitled ͚The Tiŵe Out of JoiŶt͛ ;ϭϵϵϱͿ. IŶ the play the ghost demands Hamlet 
to: ͚‘eǀeŶge his foul aŶd ŵost uŶŶatuƌal ŵuƌdeƌ!͛ (Hamlet, 1.5.25) as from another-worldly realm, 
the ghost is in a position to point out the corruption of earthly law. In his essay Derrida describes this 
task that Hamlet is set ďǇ the ghost as a ŵissioŶ to ͚[ŵake] justiĐe of a Đƌiŵe, thƌough the ǀeŶgeaŶĐe 
aŶd puŶishŵeŶt to ǁhiĐh he has Đoŵŵitted hiŵself ǁith aŶ oath͛ ;ϭϵϵϱ: ϭϴͿ. IŶ usiŶg 
25 | P a g e  
 
deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ Deƌƌida ŶeĐessaƌilǇ ďegiŶs to talk aďout justiĐe, as ͚[d]econstruction is justiĐe͛ (1992: 
15), despite the fact that justice is quite different from the revenge he confuses it with here. Though 
Derrida mistakes the distinction between justice and revenge, it is only by way of deconstruction 
that it is possible to conceive the achievement of justice which, as I will show, Hamlet succeeds in 
dispensing at the end of the play. 
At this point it is necessary to make a distinction between justice and the law, as Derrida 
takes the tiŵe to outliŶe iŶ his essaǇ ͚FoƌĐe of Laǁ͛ (1992). IŶ this essaǇ he ǁƌites: ͚deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ 
takes place in the interval that separates the undeconstructibility of justice from the 
deconstructibility of droit ;authoƌitǇ, legitiŵaĐǇ, aŶd so oŶͿ͛ ;1992: 15). The law is a set of rules that 
can be applied to reach a decision; the law is therefore calculable, whereas justice is incalculable. 
Justice is a figurative device that validates the law and its implementation, whilst functioning only 
theoretically and never in practice. Which leads us to the conclusion that JeŶŶiŶgs ǁƌites: ͚Thus laǁ 
and justice, however sharply we may need to draw a distinction between them, nevertheless require 
one another – indeed, are eŵďedded iŶ oŶe aŶotheƌ͛ ;ϮϬϬϲ: 30). Justice only exists as an ideal 
upheld to justify the law, and the law can only be enforced through the authority it is supplied with 
by justice. This symbiotic relationship shows the dependence of one upon the other in order for 
either to function. The folloǁiŶg Ƌuote fƌoŵ ͚FoƌĐe of Laǁ͛ disĐusses the iŶteƌƌelatioŶship between 
deconstruction, justice and the law:  
This deconstructible structure of law (droit), or if you prefer of justice as droit, that also 
insures the possibility of deconstruction. Justice in itself, if such a thing exists, outside or 
beyond law, is not deconstructible. No more than deconstruction itself, if such a thing exists. 
Deconstruction is justice. 
(Derrida, 1992: 15) 
Although Derrida is speaking somewhat paradoxically here, his final declaration that: 
͚DeĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ is justiĐe͛ is oŶe that ǁill be informative to our discussion of Hamlet. As we have 
already observed justice is an idealistic and transcendental ideal, beyond the reach of the law. 
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Derrida aligns deconstruction with justice. In the same way that justice is unattainable to the point 
that ǁe ƋuestioŶ ͚if suĐh a thiŶg eǆists͛ (1992: 15), so deconstruction has this similar quality of being 
beyond reach. But as we stated earlier, Derrida situates deconstruction between justice and the law. 
The law is calculable, justice is not, but deconstruction has qualities of both. Deconstruction is that 
which is seemingly unachievable but can be accessed by way of the things that are achievable, such 
as the law in this case. We are required to think paradoxically, as deconstruction allows 
simultaneous access and prohibition to the law, as well as to justice. When Derrida declares that: 
͚DeĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ is justiĐe͛ (1992: 15) therefore, he is announcing that the only way to access the 
impossible ideal of justice is by way of a deconstructive logic, where two opposing concepts (such as 
justice and the law) can be understood concurrently. In order to consider how Hamlet can attain, not 
only revenge, but justice for his father, it is necessary to take a deconstructive approach. 
Derrida situates deconstruction at this intersection between the law and justice. Hamlet is 
aware that the law is deficient as it is susceptible to corruption. Marcellus announces after 
ǁitŶessiŶg the ghost, that ͚[s]omething is rotten in the state of Denmark͛ ;Hamlet, 1.4.90), which 
suggests that the supernatural visitation has come as a result of some corruption to the state. 
Hamlet, as AŶdƌeǁ Hadfield poiŶts out, is ͚set at the Đouƌt of aŶ eleĐted ŵoŶaƌĐhǇ͛ ;ϮϬϬϰ: 28), the 
authoritative figurehead is King Claudius, and Haŵlet͛s ƌole is to aǀeŶge his fatheƌ͛s ŵuƌdeƌ ďǇ 
himself murdering the usurper. Due to the corruption of the law by the monarch himself, it falls to 
Hamlet to enforce the law, which is why the task given to him is such a burden. Hamlet declares: 
͚The tiŵe is out of joint; O Đuƌsed spite/ That eǀeƌ I ǁas ďoƌŶ to set it ƌight͛ (Hamlet, 1.5.186-187). 
Derrida comments upon his outcry in Specters of Marx:  
Hamlet curses the destiny that would have destined him to be the man of right, precisely 
[justement], as if he were cursing the right or the law itself that made him a righter of 
wrongs, 
(1994: 24)  
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Hamlet is ordered by the ghost to attain revenge in an attempt to set right the wrongdoings of his 
uncle. However, Hamlet takes upon himself more than the task of revenge that has been asked of 
hiŵ. Deƌƌida͛s ƌeadiŶg of Haŵlet͛s faŵous ƌhǇŵiŶg Đouplet pƌoposes that Haŵlet is atteŵptiŶg to 
attaiŶ, Ŷot siŵplǇ ǀeŶgeaŶĐe, ďut ƌighteousŶess. He ŵust ďe the ͚ƌighteƌ of ǁƌoŶgs͛. Haŵlet͛s raison 
d͛être aĐĐoƌdiŶg to Deƌƌida, is ͚to do ƌight, to ƌeŶdeƌ justiĐe, aŶd to ƌedƌess histoƌǇ͛ ;ϭϵϵϰ: 24). 
Derrida confuses justice with revenge, and the distinction between revenge and justice is a crucial 
one to make. On the one hand is revenge, which is achievable and culminates in a violent act upon 
the wrongdoer that is carried out in order to achieve retribution. On the other hand is justice, which 
is a model concept, an ideal that can never be achieved. Hamlet has only been asked to take 
ƌeǀeŶge, ďut Deƌƌida talks of Haŵlet͛s Ŷeed to attaiŶ justiĐe. OŶe ǁaǇ to ƌeĐoŶĐile Deƌƌida͛s 
iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ ;that Haŵlet͛s puƌpose is to attaiŶ justiĐeͿ, ǁith the ƌole of ƌeǀeŶge that he is set iŶ 
the play, is to argue that although Hamlet is only solicited to take revenge he takes it upon himself to 
seek justice as opposed to vengeance, and this is the view we will take here.  
Haŵlet has a pƌopeŶsitǇ foƌ uŶĐeƌtaiŶtǇ, ǁhiĐh the audieŶĐe ƌealise iŶitiallǇ iŶ Haŵlet͛s 
iŶdeĐisiǀeŶess oŶ ǁhetheƌ oƌ Ŷot to ďelieǀe iŶ the ghost͛s stoƌǇ, iŶ additioŶ Haŵlet lateƌ displaǇs 
doubt about how and when to take revenge. In his aim to dispense justice Hamlet must first learn 
whether or not the ghost is telling the truth, which will relieve his uncertainty so that his actions may 
be justified. To begin his quest for justice, as opposed to vengeance, Hamlet must first determine 
whether or not the story the ghost has told him is true. His initial scepticism of the veracity of the 
ghost relieves Hamlet temporarily from the moral obligation to exact both: the revenge that is 
demanded of him and to respond to the call for justice, which he has taken upon himself to deliver. 
Although Haŵlet is, iŶitiallǇ, sĐeptiĐal of the ghost aŶd ƋuestioŶs its iŶteŶtioŶs: ͚Be thou a spiƌit of 
health of goďliŶ daŵŶed͛ ;Hamlet, 1.4.40), following their ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶ he deteƌŵiŶes that it ͚is aŶ 
hoŶest ghost͛ ;Hamlet, 1.5.137). However, Hamlet later reverts back to his initial scepticism, 
ƌeiteƌatiŶg: ͚The spiƌit that I haǀe seeŶ/ MaǇ ďe a de͛il͛ ;Hamlet, 2.2.533-534). 
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Even though Hamlet must wait to discover the truth before he can take action, one of the 
notable aporias of justice that Drucilla Cornell outlines in The Philosophy of the Limit (1992), is that: 
͚JustiĐe does Ŷot ǁait͛ ;ϭϵϵϮ: ϭϯϰͿ. Hamlet, however, shows us that justice can and does wait, even 
if this prolongs injustice. Justice is that which requires an immediate response, but in order to ensure 
the ƌight aĐtioŶs aƌe takeŶ oŶe ŵust ǁait aŶd take the tiŵe to leaƌŶ the tƌuth. Haŵlet͛s sĐeptiĐisŵ 
of the ghost provides him with an excuse to delay iŶ ƌespoŶse to the ghost͛s deŵand for revenge 
and in his own task of justice. Hamlet is aware of his uncertainty and aims to dispel it:  
I͛ll haǀe gƌouŶds  
 Moƌe ƌelatiǀe thaŶ this. The plaǇ͛s the thiŶg  
 WheƌeiŶ I͛ll Đatch the conscience of the King. 
(Hamlet, 2.2.538-540) 
Our protagonist here, as most protagonists in revenge tragedies do, produces a secret plot against 
the villain. However, in most other revenge tragedies this plot would be to take revenge, as in The 
‘eǀenger͛s Tragedy by Middleton, where Vindice plots to take revenge against the murderer of his 
beloved.2 However, in Hamlet the plot to put on the play is not one aimed at attaining revenge, but 
is a plot to discover the truth in the search for justice. Hamlet appropriately terms the play: ͚The 
Mousetrap͛ (Hamlet, 3.2.231) as it is set to ĐatĐh out Claudius͛ guiltǇ ĐoŶsĐieŶĐe. Haŵlet is Ŷot 
simply seeking to attain vengeance, as he wants to learn the truth in order that the state can be 
rightfully restored.  
The Mousetrap is successful in revealiŶg Claudius͛ guilt; folloǁiŶg this ƌeǀelatioŶ Haŵlet͛s 
scepticism is no longer a viable excuse to delay in responding to the call for justice which, as Cornell 
noted, is required immediately and he has already been delaying. An opportunity for Hamlet arises 
to deliver justice following the performance of the play as the king retires to pray and gives voice to 
                                                          
2 Fƌoŵ the opeŶiŶg speeĐh of the plaǇ ViŶdiĐe ƌefeƌs to his desiƌe foƌ ƌeǀeŶge: ͚Muƌdeƌ uŶpaid? Faith, giǀe 
‘eǀeŶge heƌ due/ “h͛as kept touĐh hitheƌto – ďe ŵeƌƌǇ, ŵeƌƌǇ/ AdǀaŶĐe thee,͛ ;ϭ.ϭ.ϰϯ-45) and later in the 
sĐeŶe it is ƌeǀealed ViŶdiĐe͛s ďƌotheƌ, Hippolito, is alƌeadǇ aĐtiŶg as a spǇ iŶ the Đouƌt iŶ oƌdeƌ to plot to eǆaĐt 
ƌeǀeŶge agaiŶst the ŵuƌdeƌeƌ. MiddletoŶ, T. ;ϭϵϴϴͿ. ͚The ‘eǀeŶgeƌ͛s TƌagedǇ͛, Thomas Middleton: Five Plays. 
London: Penguin Classics.  
29 | P a g e  
 
his crimes. Nevertheless, justice is once again deferred. Notably in Hamlet the teƌŵ ͚justiĐe͛ is used 
only once, and ironically it is spoken by the murderous usurper iŶ this ͚pƌaǇeƌ sĐeŶe͛. To follow on 
from the earlier discussion of the distinction between the law and justice, which was considered 
from a Derridean perspective, we will now examine how Shakespeare observes the difference 
through the villain of the play. In this scene Claudius says:  
In the corrupted currents of this world 
OffeŶĐe͛s gilded haŶd ŵaǇ shoǀe ďǇ justiĐe,  
AŶd oft ͚tis seeŶ the ǁiĐked pƌize itself 
BuǇs out the laǁ; ďut ͚tis Ŷot so aďoǀe: 
There is no shuffling, there the action lies 
In his true nature, 
(Hamlet, 3.3.57-62) 
Claudius recognises the corruptibility of earthly laws, as he himself has managed to evade justice for 
committing the atrocity of murdering his own brother. However, unlike the law which can be 
bought, Claudius identifies justice as something divine and transcendental that cannot be cheated. 
Claudius͛ ǀieǁ of justiĐe as tƌaŶsĐeŶdeŶtal is the saŵe as Deƌƌida͛s ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of justiĐe, ǁhiĐh 
JeŶŶiŶgs ĐhaƌaĐteƌises as folloǁs: ͚it ǁill ďe ŶeĐessaƌǇ to thiŶk of justice outside, beyond, and even 
agaiŶst laǁ͛ ;ϮϬϬϲ: ϭϵͿ. JustiĐe is iŶĐoƌƌuptiďle as it is ďeǇoŶd the laǁ, ǁhiĐh provides it with an 
idealistic and elevated status. However, by the same token that gives justice this supreme 
significance; it is also unrealistic and unattainable. Thus, Haŵlet͛s atteŵpt, Ŷot siŵplǇ to oďtaiŶ 
reǀeŶge ďut to ͚set it ƌight͛ ;Hamlet, 1.5.187) and to deliver justice, is an impossible task. As Hamlet 
has Ŷoǁ pƌoǀed the hoŶestǇ of the ghost aŶd leaƌŶed of his uŶĐle͛s guilt, he ĐaŶ Ŷo longer use his 
scepticism as an excuse to delay in taking the revenge that has been asked of him. Still, as Hamlet 
has set himself the task of delivering justice and not only taking revenge, and as justice is an 
unattainable ideal, it is not surprising therefore that in his mission to achieve the impossible Hamlet 
is led into philosophical contemplation and ultimately paralysis. Although Hamlet is paralysed from 
action, as a result of the weight of his difficult task, in the prayer scene we see him get very close to 
taking action:  
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Noǁ ŵight I do it. But Ŷoǁ ͚a is a-praying. 
AŶd Ŷoǁ I͛ll do it [Draws sword.] – aŶd so ͚a goes to heaǀeŶ, 
[...] And am I then revenged 
To take him in the purging of his soul 
When he is fit and seasoned for his passage?  
No. [Sheathes sword.] 
(Hamlet, 3.3.73-74, 84-87) 
Hamlet has the perfect opportunity to take revenge in this scene but he wants more than 
vengeance. Hamlet seeks justice by killing Claudius while the weight of his crimes is upon him, as 
they were upon his father ǁheŶ Claudius ŵuƌdeƌed hiŵ. CƌitiĐ EleaŶoƌ Pƌosseƌ Ŷotes that foƌ ͚oǀeƌ 
tǁo ĐeŶtuƌies ĐƌitiĐs haǀe ďeeŶ peƌsoŶallǇ appalled ďǇ Haŵlet͛s eǆpƌessed ƌeasoŶ foƌ ƌefusiŶg to kill 
Claudius at pƌaǇeƌ͛ ;ϭϵϳϭ: ϭϴϵͿ. Hoǁeǀeƌ, to laǇ his fatheƌ͛s ghost to ƌest it is necessary for Hamlet to 
offer retributive justice. Despite the fact that Haŵlet͛s ŵotiǀatioŶs seeŵ appalliŶg aŶd ǀioleŶt, he 
defers this violence and instead waits for the right moment to deliver justice. A moment which 
arrives at the close of the play as Hamlet has the opportunity to kill Claudius with a poison that has 
been produced by the villain himself. Haŵlet͛s eǆĐuse foƌ delaǇ iŶ the pƌaǇeƌ sĐeŶe is Ŷo loŶgeƌ his 
scepticism of the truthfulness of the ghost, but that he wishes to deliver a totalising form of justice, 
not only to Claudius, but to all those who have committed murder, and to do this requires Hamlet 
not to bestow revenge upon Claudius whilst he is at prayer. As we will see in the next chapter, 
Claudius͛s pƌaǇeƌ is holloǁ iŶ peƌfoƌŵatiǀe terms. For now, however, let us note that although 
Haŵlet is ŵotiǀated Ŷot to take ƌeǀeŶge at this poiŶt, as he ďelieǀes Claudius͛ pƌaǇeƌ ǁill saǀe his 
soul, the audience are made aware that the prayer does not save his soul. In his efforts to make a 
just decision Hamlet perpetuates the injustice that Claudius should continue to live as King of 
Denmark and husband to Gertrude. Notwithstanding this, as Derrida remarks in Specters of Marx, 
the perpetuation of injustice is a necessary risk to take in order to have the possibility of attaining 
justice:  
Beyond right, and still more beyond juridicism, beyond morality, and still more beyond 
moralism, does not justice as relation to the other suppose on the contrary the irreducible 
excess of a disjointure or an anachƌoŶǇ, [...] soŵe ͞out of joiŶt͟ disloĐatioŶ iŶ BeiŶg aŶd iŶ 
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time itself, a disjointure that, in always risking the evil, expropriation, and injustice (adikia) 
against which there is no calculable insurance, would alone be able to do justice or to render 
justice to the other as other? 
(1994: 32) 
Haŵlet is tƌǇiŶg to aĐhieǀe justiĐe foƌ the ͚otheƌ͛, that is to saǇ his fatheƌ͛s ghost. IŶ the pƌoĐess of 
this quest for justice Hamlet experiences anachrony and disjointure of time and of his own Being, in 
addition to ironically allowing the injustice to continue. As outlined from the start of this chapter, it 
will be necessary to apply a paradoxical deconstructive logic in order to consider a way in which it is 
possible for Hamlet to obtain justice. Thus, injustice is a requirement for the possibility of justice, 
aŶd it is oŶlǇ ďǇ ǁaǇ of ĐoŶtiŶuiŶg iŶjustiĐe that it is possiďle foƌ Haŵlet to ͚render justice to the 
otheƌ͛, to his fatheƌ aŶd to eǀeƌǇoŶe else at the eŶd of the plaǇ.   
 Justice, like mourning, is both spectral and anachronic. However, whereas mourning 
requires the challenging process of interiorisation, which is itself anachronic, justice is an 
internalised ideal that Hamlet must externalise and enact. The spectre is an entity that deconstructs 
the oppositioŶ ďetǁeeŶ pƌeseŶĐe aŶd aďseŶĐe, the ghost of Haŵlet͛s fatheƌ is theƌe aŶd Ŷot theƌe. 
It is there, visible to multiple witnesses, yet it does not share the same corporeality as those who 
bear witness to it and is thus not there. It is an absent presence. Justice shares this spectral quality 
with the ghost of being an absent presence. Justice is absent as it has not yet been attained, 
however, Hamlet is persistently motivated to accomplish justice and in this way it is present. It 
hauŶts Haŵlet͛s thoughts, decisions and actions throughout the play and, although justice may be 
being continually deferred, the influence of justice is visible even in, and in fact motivates, Haŵlet͛s 
inaction. In addition to being spectral, justice is also anachronic. Let us now consider this spectral 
anachrony. WheŶ Haŵlet deĐlaƌes that ͚[t]he tiŵe is out of joiŶt͛ ;Hamlet, 1.5.186), he is not only 
cursing his destiny as Derrida proposes in Specters of Marx (1994), or even only referring to the 
experience of anachrony in ŵouƌŶiŶg that Deƌƌida lateƌ uŶdeƌstaŶds iŶ ͚The Tiŵe is Out of JoiŶt͛ 
(1995), but Hamlet is also referring to an anachronic experience of justice.  
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As Hamlet is in mourning he is undergoing the process of interiorisation that requires him to 
think of his father retrospectively, as he now only continues to exist from within him. Nevertheless, 
the role Hamlet has taken upon himself to deliver justice also requires him to look to a future where 
the moment of attaining justice is possible, because as Derrida saǇs, justiĐe is alǁaǇs ͚avenir͛ oƌ ͚to-
Đoŵe͛ ;ϭϵϵϮ: ϮϳͿ. Haŵlet is siŵultaŶeouslǇ iŶ the pƌoĐess of ƌetƌospeĐtiǀelǇ ƌeŵeŵďeƌiŶg his fatheƌ 
as he was and trying to internalise the dead as part of his work of mourning, whilst also requiring a 
proleptic view iŶ teƌŵs of justiĐe to ĐoŶsideƌ a futuƌe ǁheƌe justiĐe ĐaŶ ďe attaiŶed aŶd his fatheƌ͛s 
ghost ĐaŶ ďe laid to ƌest as the state ǁill ďe ͚set [...] ƌight͛ ;Hamlet, 1.5.187). The mission of justice is 
anachronic as it requires Hamlet to think futuristically and this disjoins him from living in the present 
moment. As the interminability of mourning deconstructs a linear understanding of time, and 
necessitates Hamlet to think retrospectively, so the anachronistic experience of justice deconstructs 
a linear understanding of time, as it requires him to think proleptically. In terms of mourning as well 
as of justice, the time really is out of joint as can be recognised by taking spectral anachrony, the 
combination of spectrality with atemporality, into account. This disjointure is also experienced in 
Haŵlet͛s ĐoŶfliĐtiŶg effoƌts to iŶteƌŶalise the dead as paƌt of his ǁoƌk of ŵouƌŶiŶg ǁhilst 
simultaneously attempting to externalise his internal aspiration to deliver justice. Spectrality and 
anachrony are inseparable, it is impossible to have one without the other.   
 
 At the eŶd of Đhapteƌ ϭ oŶ ͚Haŵlet͛s CoŵpliĐated Woƌk of MouƌŶiŶg͛, I ƌeaĐhed the 
ĐoŶĐlusioŶ that a ŶeĐessaƌǇ ĐoŶditioŶ foƌ Haŵlet͛s suĐĐess to Đoŵplete the ǁoƌk of ŵouƌŶiŶg ǁas 
the failure to complete it. As mourning can never be completed, it is necessary to fail in order to 
suĐĐeed. “iŵilaƌlǇ, iŶ the Đase of justiĐe, it is oŶlǇ thƌough Haŵlet͛s ĐoŶtiŶual failuƌe to aǀeŶge the 
ghost, and his ironic perpetuation of injustice, that Hamlet can have the possibility of attaining 
justice for his father, as opposed to simply revenge. Hamlet enacts justice through his continual 
defeƌƌal of ƌeǀeŶge. EsseŶtial to aƌguiŶg foƌ Haŵlet͛s suĐĐess iŶ aĐhieǀiŶg justiĐe, thƌough the 
defeƌƌal of it, is Deƌƌida͛s ĐoŶĐept of uŶdeĐidaďilitǇ. Let us heƌe ďƌieflǇ outliŶe Deƌƌida͛s ǀieǁs oŶ 
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decision-ŵakiŶg iŶ oƌdeƌ to aƌgue that Haŵlet͛s iŶdeĐisioŶ, ǁhiĐh iƌoŶiĐallǇ peƌpetuates iŶjustiĐe, is 
iŶ faĐt the oŶlǇ ǁaǇ Haŵlet ĐaŶ possiďlǇ attaiŶ justiĐe. IŶ his aƌtiĐle ͚BetǁeeŶ JustiĐe aŶd Legality: 
Derrida on deĐisioŶ͛ “okoloff tells us that: ͚deĐisioŶ is aŶ aĐt of iŶǀeŶtioŶ that ĐaŶŶot ďe gƌouŶded 
oŶ aŶǇthiŶg that pƌeĐedes it͛ ;ϮϬϬϱ: ϯϰϱͿ. This liŶks to aŶotheƌ apoƌia of justiĐe, ǁhiĐh is outliŶed ďǇ 
CoƌŶell as folloǁs: ͚If a deĐisioŶ is ŵeƌelǇ ĐalĐulatioŶ, it is Ŷot a deĐisioŶ͛ ;ϭϵϵϮ: ϭϯϰͿ. IŶ oƌdeƌ to 
make a difficult decision it is necessary to break with that which comes before it, for a decision to 
truly have been reached it must be made anew. However, making an unprecedented judgement 
ƌeƋuiƌes uŶdeĐidaďilitǇ: ͚IŶ the aĐt of deĐisioŶ, ǁe ŵust Ŷot kŶoǁ ǁho ǁe aƌe oƌ hoǁ ǁe aƌe goiŶg 
to deĐide͛ ;“okoloff, ϮϬϬϱ: ϯϰϱͿ. We ĐaŶ see hoǁ the ďiŶaƌies deĐoŶstƌuĐt theŵselǀes; ĐeƌtaiŶtǇ 
requires uncertainty and for a decision to be made it must have developed through a process of the 
undecidable. Let us return then to Hamlet. Foƌ Haŵlet͛s iŶdeĐisioŶ is aĐtuallǇ a ǀital part of the 
decision-making process, for him to reach a just conclusion he cannot know what to decide, or even 
himself.  
 
This is pƌeĐiselǇ Haŵlet͛s pƌediĐaŵeŶt: iŶ deĐidiŶg hoǁ to aĐt ǁith ƌegaƌds to attaiŶiŶg 
justice for his father he loses his entire sense of self. The question therefore shifts beyond being 
aďout ǁhetheƌ oƌ Ŷot ͚to take aƌŵs agaiŶst a sea of tƌouďles͛ ;Hamlet, 3.1.58), but it becomes a 
question of his own Being. For Hamlet this decision is no longer a matter of taking vengeance for his 
fatheƌ ďut: ͚To ďe, oƌ Ŷot to ďe͛ ;Hamlet, 3.1.55). Hamlet, in his indecision of how to act upon his 
fatheƌ͛s ĐoŵŵaŶd foƌ ǀeŶgeaŶĐe has been led into philosophical inquisition of the nature of 
existence and his reasoning leads him to question, not only the veracity of the ghost, but also the 
nature of vengeance, as he instead chooses to try and attain justice for his father. Hamlet is not 
procrastinating from taking revenge but trying to move away from a judicial system that sees violent 
revenge as the key to attaining justice. In his indecision Hamlet encourages the audience to rethink 
the ways in which justice actually functions and seeks a fairer way to attain it, whilst at the same 
tiŵe poŶdeƌiŶg the deepest huŵaŶ ĐoŶĐeƌŶ of ǁhat it ŵeaŶs to eǆist. HeŶĐe, it is Haŵlet͛s defeƌƌal 
34 | P a g e  
 
from action that results in the necessary examination of the expectations of vengeance that move 
the debate on to a view of possibly achieving justice. As justice is anachronic, and therefore cannot 
be achieved in a single moment, the whole process of indecision that Hamlet goes through is 
essential to attaining justice. Thus, Hamlet is, without taking action, enacting justice. 
 
 By the denouement of the play Hamlet is deemed to have succeeded in his mission to obtain 
justice by his own dramatic foil, Laertes. Just as Hamlet is set the task of seeking revenge for the 
murder of his father, so Laertes seeks revenge for the murder of his father. Shakespeare places the 
two in opposition: Hamlet has the opportunity to murder Claudius whilst he is in prayer and yet he 
chooses not to do it in favour of the quest for justice; however, when faced with the same task to 
take revenge for his murdered father, Laertes ominously announces that to obtain revenge against 
the ŵuƌdeƌeƌ he ǁould: ͚Đut his thƌoat i͛th͛ ĐhuƌĐh͛ ;Hamlet, 4.7.124). Unlike Hamlet who, given this 
same opportunity, reasoned himself out of it in favour of waiting in the quest for justice; Laertes is 
only seeking to accomplish vengeance and is instead only on the bloodthirsty path of revenge. Janet 
Clare recognises that, uŶlike Haŵlet, Laeƌtes ͚eŶjoǇs the pƌospeĐt of the ƌeǀeŶgeƌ͛s paƌt͛ ;ϮϬϬϳ: ϰϮͿ. 
In Specters of Marx Derrida asks:  
If right or law stems from vengeance, as Hamlet seems to complain that it does [...] can one 
not yearn for a justice that one day, a day belonging no longer to history, a quasi-messianic 
day, would finally be removed from the fatality of vengeance? 
(1994: 25) 
Hamlet, in seeking to dispense justice to all involved, as opposed to exacting revenge, is radically 
criticising the judicial system and the emphasis it places on retribution. Instead when taking the law 
into his own hands, Hamlet decides to break with the traditional expectations of simply applying the 
law, which would be unjust as: ͚If a deĐisioŶ is ŵeƌelǇ ĐalĐulatioŶ, it is Ŷot a deĐisioŶ͛ ;CoƌŶell, ϭϵϵϮ: 
134). Instead of calculating the law and applying it, Hamlet instead seeks to break with the law and 
tƌǇ to attaiŶ justiĐe. WheŶ disĐussiŶg Deƌƌida aŶd justiĐe Weďeƌ saǇs ͚[o]Ŷe ŵust tƌǇ to thiŶk it 
staƌtiŶg fƌoŵ the possiďilitǇ of siŶgulaƌitǇ͛ ;ϮϬϬϱ: ϯϵͿ. IŶ oƌdeƌ to deliǀeƌ justiĐe Haŵlet ŵust thiŶk 
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on an individual case basis and take into consideration various perspectives and wait, even at the 
risk of propagating injustice, to discover the truth and restore the state to right.  
 
In the final act Claudius produces a poison, which he intends to use to murder Hamlet; 
however, Claudius receives his just deserts as Hamlet forces him to drink his own poison, 
ĐoŶseƋueŶtlǇ eŶdiŶg his life. FolloǁiŶg the kiŶg͛s death Haŵlet͛s dƌaŵatiĐ foil, Laeƌtes, aŶŶouŶĐes 
͚[h]e is justlǇ seƌǀed. / It is a poisoŶ teŵpeƌed ďǇ hiŵself͛ ;Hamlet, 5.2.312-313). Hamlet has delayed 
this moment of rendering justice through his scepticism and through his propagation of injustice by 
not killing Claudius in the prayer scene. Unlike other tragic revengers, including Laertes himself, 
Hamlet has refused to take revenge in preference of the quest for truth and justice. Although he has 
risked injustice along the way, Haŵlet͛s ŵotiǀatioŶs haǀe ďeeŶ to attaiŶ justiĐe foƌ his father and by 
the end of the play he manages to achieve this by forcing Claudius to drink his own poison. Derrida 
ŵight ǁell haǀe Đalled this situatioŶ ͚“hakespeaƌe͛s PhaƌŵaĐǇ͛. 
 
PƌeŶdeƌgast iŶfoƌŵs us: ͚IŶ the fiŶal, ŵuƌdeƌous sĐeŶe of the plaǇ, ǀeŶgeaŶĐe aŶd justiĐe aƌe 
fiŶallǇ eŶaĐted͛ ;ϮϬϬϱ: 47). By the end of the play all the guilty dramatis personae meet a fitting end. 
Gertrude, for example, accidentally commits suicide by drinking from a cup poisoned by her lover. As 
she ŵaƌƌied heƌ husďaŶd͛s ďƌotheƌ it is fittiŶg that heƌ death is ďƌought aďout as a ƌesult of his 
treachery. RosencraŶtz aŶd GuildeŶsteƌŶ ďetƌaǇ theiƌ fƌieŶd Haŵlet iŶ faǀouƌ of doiŶg Claudius͛ 
ďiddiŶg, as theǇ folloǁ the ǀillaiŶ͛s oƌdeƌs to aĐĐoŵpaŶǇ Haŵlet to EŶglaŶd ǁheƌe he is to ďe 
executed: It is appropriate then that Hamlet, upon discovering his death warrant, similarly betrays 
his friends and replaces his own death warrant with one demanding the execution of Rosencrantz 
and Guildenstern. In addition to this apt form of justice delivered to the guilty, Hamlet achieves a 
totalising justice for the murderers in this play, which in addition to the death of Claudius, also 
necessitates the deaths of Laertes and Hamlet himself. Laertes, having conspired with Claudius to 
murder Hamlet is also justly slain at the end of the play. In the same way that Claudius is, quite 
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appropriately, slain by drinking his own poison, Laertes endures a similar fitting form of justice. 
Laeƌtes hiŵself adŵits: ͚I aŵ justlǇ killed ǁith ŵiŶe oǁŶ tƌeaĐheƌǇ͛ ;Hamlet, 5.2.92). Hamlet and 
Laertes inadvertently swap swords during the fencing duel and Laertes is murdered with the sword 
he himself poisoned, which he also successfully inflicts Hamlet with. Thus, Laertes also suitably 
achieves justice for the death of his father Polonius, whom Hamlet murdered earlier in the play. 
Both sons have avenged theiƌ fatheƌs͛ deaths ďǇ takiŶg the life of theiƌ ŵuƌdeƌeƌs with their own 
hand. More than vengeance though, Hamlet has successfully achieved total justice against the 
murderers by the end of the play, as all those who have committed the crime of murder are killed by 
the hand of the son of the father that they have murdered, or in the case of Laertes, by the person 
they have murdered themselves. As we noted earlier however, injustice is an unfortunate, yet 
necessary part of the quest to attain justice. Ophelia is completely innocent, and yet just like the liars 
and murderers in this play she too meets her death. However, as highlighted earlier, the way in 
which death occurs (and at whose hand) is essential with regards to determining whether or not 
justice has been achieved. Ophelia commits suicide and her death is not an intended part of 
Haŵlet͛s Ƌuest foƌ justiĐe; iŶ faĐt heƌ death is oŶe of the feǁ thiŶgs that ŵotiǀates Haŵlet to take 
action, as he leaps into her grave to declare his love for her in the final act of the play. This leaves us 
then with Polonius. Though he is not entirely guiltless, (as he has people spy on his son, prevents his 
daughter from seeing the man she loves, as well as manipulating her to his own ends in order to act 
as the right man to a, ǁhetheƌ he kŶoǁs it oƌ Ŷot, fƌatƌiĐidal usuƌpeƌͿ PoloŶius͛ death does seeŵ 
unjust. Perhaps Polonius is the collateral damage in this Ƌuest foƌ justiĐe, of ǁhiĐh Ophelia͛s suiĐide 
is also an unfortunate by-pƌoduĐt. UltiŵatelǇ though, Haŵlet͛s ŵissioŶ to attain total justice against 
those who have committed murder is achieved at the end of the play, despite the high price of 
injustice towards others that accompanies it. 
 
Afteƌ disĐussiŶg Haŵlet͛s self-assigned mission to attain justice as opposed to vengeance, 
MeƌĐeƌ͛s deteƌŵiŶatioŶ that: ͚Not oŶlǇ is Hamlet Ŷot a ƌeǀeŶge tƌagedǇ; it is haƌdlǇ a tƌagedǇ at all͛ 
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(1987: 246) becomes less challenging to understand. Hamlet is not a revenge tragedy as the prince 
seeks to attain justice, not vengeance. Hamlet succeeds in achieving the impossible and dispenses a 
form of justice to the guilty and total justice to the murderers at the end of the play, liberating the 
state of Denmark from the rule of the murderous villain Claudius. Despite the ďloodshed, the plaǇ͛s 
resolution is not tragic, but optimistic as it points towards the possibility of achieving justice. Justice 
is possible in Hamlet through the use of a deconstructive logic. Deferral, even though it seemingly 
countenances injustice, is a part of the process of attaining justice. Hamlet demonstrates that justice 
is possiďle ďǇ ǁaǇ of deĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ; it is thƌough Haŵlet͛s ĐoŶtiŶual failuƌe to aĐhieǀe ǀeŶgeaŶĐe 
that Hamlet finally succeeds, in the case of those who have committed murder, in attaining a 
totalising form of justice at the closure of the play.  
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Chapter 3: Performativity 
 
The spectre of justice can also be recognised to be at work in Hamlet through an analysis of 
performativity, which this chapter will endeavour to explore. To begin with this chapter will offer an 
eǆplaŶatioŶ of peƌfoƌŵatiǀitǇ; iŶĐludiŶg Deƌƌida͛s ĐƌitiĐisŵ aŶd deǀelopŵeŶt of this teƌŵ aĐƌoss the 
course of his writing, as his initial understanding of the term is altered by his concept of spectrality in 
his later works. Derrida discusses performativity within Hamlet iŶ his aŶalǇsis of the ͚oath sĐeŶe͛ aŶd 
the influence of spectrality upon this reading is evident here. Chapter 1 concluded that, despite the 
spectral anachrony, Shakespeare was experimenting with the developing idea that people possess 
an interior subjectivity in Hamlet. This concept of an internally governed, inaccessible space within 
the mind is necessitous to an understanding of performativity. The distinction between the spirit and 
the spectre can be made with reference to the difference between interiority and exteriority, as the 
spirit is that which is interior whereas the spectre is the externalisation of the interior. This 
important division marks the difference between an Austinian and Derridean conception of 
performativity.  
 
IŶ AustiŶ͛s ϭϵϱϱ Williaŵ Jaŵes LeĐtuƌes, lateƌ puďlished as ͚Hoǁ to do Things ǁith Words͛ in 
1962, he proposes the case for performative utterances or sentences. Unlike recognised constative 
utterances, which present something as true or false, Austin suggests that performatives do not 
͚describe my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to be doing or to state that I am doing it: it 
is to do it͛ ;ϭϵϳϲ: ϲͿ. Woƌds do thiŶgs. IŶ a suďtitle that eĐhoes Haŵlet͛s philosophiĐal outďurst: 
͚theƌe is ŶothiŶg eitheƌ good oƌ ďad, ďut thiŶkiŶg ŵakes it so͛ ;“hakespeaƌe, ϭϴϵϭ: 2.2.255-6), Austin 
asks ͚CaŶ saǇiŶg ŵake it so?͛ ;ϭϵϳϲ: ϳͿ.3 Performative speech acts not only say the words, but in 
being uttered produce the action. As Hamlet is often criticised for his inaction, this chapter will 
eǆaŵiŶe the use of peƌfoƌŵatiǀes ǁithiŶ the plaǇ to shoǁ hoǁ Haŵlet aĐts liŶguistiĐallǇ. Deƌƌida͛s 
                                                          
3 Note that although I refer to the Second Quarto edition of Hamlet thƌoughout the thesis, Haŵlet͛s 
philosophical musing quoted here only appears in the Folio.  
39 | P a g e  
 
faŵiliaƌitǇ ǁith AustiŶ͛s ǁoƌk dates ďaĐk to his ǁell-kŶoǁŶ ϭϵϳϭ essaǇ ͚“igŶatuƌe EǀeŶt CoŶteǆt͛. 
This paper later provoked a very public exchange with John Searle.4 Despite his criticism of 
performativity, Derrida has continued to engage with the idea throughout his career; his 
understanding of performativity also later informed his analysis of the oath scene in Hamlet, which 
we will analyse here. This is how Derrida redefines the term:  
[...] performativity for me is [...] that which produces events, all institutions and acts in which 
responsibility is to be assumed; but it is also that which neutralizes the event, that is to say, 
what happens. 
(2000: 467) 
A peƌfoƌŵatiǀe Đƌeates aŶ eǀeŶt; foƌ eǆaŵple a Đouple gettiŶg ŵaƌƌied aŶd utteƌiŶg the ǁoƌds ͚I do͛ 
are producing a new marriage. However, Derrida says that performativity also neutralises the event. 
In order for this marriage to be acknowledged it must repeat the recognised, accepted conditions for 
a marriage: in this sense it is not a new event, but re-iterates that which has occurred many times 
ďefoƌe. “aǇiŶg ͚I do͛ ƌe-affirms the power of the marriage institution, thus neutralising the 
uniqueness of the event by legitimising the institution which produced it. 
 
Austin identifies a difficulty with the concept of performativity that Derrida later criticises. 
After classifying performatives as words that do things, Austin states a condition for the 
peƌfoƌŵatiǀe: ͚the ǁoƌds ŵust ďe spokeŶ ͚seƌiouslǇ͛ [...] theiƌ ďeiŶg seƌious ĐoŶsists iŶ theiƌ ďeiŶg 
utteƌed as ;ŵeƌelǇͿ the outǁaƌd aŶd ǀisiďle sigŶ [...] of aŶ iŶǁaƌd aŶd spiƌitual aĐt͛ ;ϭϵϳϲ: ϵͿ. In order 
for performatives to be happy or felicitous, as Austin terms them, they must be spoken with the 
speakeƌ͛s iŶteŶtioŶ to fulfil theŵ. Theƌefoƌe, if a peƌfoƌŵatiǀe is utteƌed ďut the speakeƌ does Ŷot 
inwardly commit to acting upon those words, the performative is not false but, what Austin terms, 
͚iŶfeliĐitous͛ (1976: 16). Derrida criticises this in ͚“igŶatuƌe EǀeŶt CoŶteǆt͛ arguing that, to be able to 
deteƌŵiŶe ǁhetheƌ a peƌfoƌŵatiǀe is feliĐitous oƌ Ŷot ͚ĐoŶsĐious iŶteŶtioŶ ǁould at the ǀeƌǇ least 
                                                          
4 FolloǁiŶg the puďliĐatioŶ of Deƌƌida͛s essaǇ ͚“igŶatuƌe EǀeŶt CoŶteǆt͛, JohŶ “eaƌle ƌespoŶded ǁith an essay 
eŶtitled: ͚‘eplǇ to Deƌƌida: ‘eiteƌatiŶg the DiffeƌeŶĐes͛ iŶ ǁhiĐh he ĐƌitiĐises Deƌƌida͛s iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ of AustiŶ. 
Deƌƌida ƌeplied to “eaƌle͛s ĐƌitiƋue ǁith aŶotheƌ essaǇ titled ͚Liŵited Inc. a ď Đ...͛ The title of this essaǇ ǁas 
later used as the title of a ďook puďlished iŶ ϭϵϴϴ, ǁhiĐh ĐoŶtaiŶs a suŵŵaƌǇ of “eaƌle͛s ƌespoŶse aŶd ďoth of 
Deƌƌida͛s essaǇs. 
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have to be totallǇ pƌeseŶt aŶd iŵŵediatelǇ tƌaŶspaƌeŶt to itself aŶd otheƌs,͛ ;ϭϵϴϴ: ϭϴͿ. It is 
impossible to know the interior subjectivity of an individual, and according to Derrida the inward 
intention may not even be entirely present to the individual themselves. Thus, Derrida questions 
ǁhetheƌ oƌ Ŷot theƌe is suĐh a thiŶg as a ͚feliĐitous͛ (Austin, 1976: 42) performative. 
This diŵeŶsioŶ of Deƌƌida͛s ĐƌitiƋue of AustiŶ is alƌeadǇ ǁell kŶoǁŶ. What Deƌƌida oǀeƌlooks 
iŶ AustiŶ, hoǁeǀeƌ, is the phƌase ͚aŶ iŶǁaƌd aŶd spiƌitual aĐt͛ (Austin, 1976: 9), as performativity is 
curiously dependent upon the spiritual. Austin emphasises the importance of spirituality when he 
goes oŶ to saǇ: ͚Thus ͚I pƌoŵise to . . .͛ oďliges ŵe – puts on record my spiritual assumption of a 
spiritual shaĐkle͛ ;ϭϵϳϲ: ϭϬͿ. Deƌƌida ŵisses the eǆteŶt to ǁhiĐh, alƌeadǇ iŶ AustiŶ͛s teǆt, theƌe is a 
relationship between performativity and the spiritual – a term which Derrida also links with the 
speĐtƌal. AustiŶ͛s foƌŵulatioŶ of the peƌfoƌŵatiǀe alƌeadǇ ĐoŶtaiŶs a spectral dimension, which 
AustiŶ ƌefeƌs to as the spiƌitual. Thus, it is Ŷot suƌpƌisiŶg that, iŶ his essaǇ ͚Ghost WƌitiŶg͛, Deƌek 
Attƌidge assigŶs a peƌfoƌŵatiǀe sigŶifiĐaŶĐe to the ghost of the kiŶg, aƌguiŶg: ͚The ghost speaks 
performatively – it is itself a performative – nothing will be the same again after it has appeared and 
spokeŶ͛ ;ϮϬϬϭ: ϭϳϲͿ.  Heƌe Attƌidge ƌightlǇ ďegiŶs to affiliate peƌfoƌŵatiǀitǇ ǁith the speĐtƌal; 
although, arguably, this affiliation was always already present in Austin.  
Swearing an oath is a performative act. In Hamlet both Horatio and Marcellus are asked by 
the pƌiŶĐe to: ͚Neǀeƌ ŵake kŶoǁŶ ǁhat Ǉou haǀe seeŶ toŶight͛ ;Hamlet, 1.5.143). Hamlet is 
uŶĐoŶǀiŶĐed ďǇ theiƌ uŶified ƌeplǇ: ͚MǇ loƌd, ǁe ǁill Ŷot͛ ;Hamlet, 1.5.144), and asks them to swear 
that they will not, both vocally and by his sword. The oath requires both the performative utterance: 
͚IŶ faith, ŵǇ loƌd, Ŷot I͛ ;Hamlet, 1.5.145) and a performance of placing their hand upon the sword, 
which the ghost also commands theŵ to do: ͚sǁeaƌ͛ ;Hamlet, 1.5.149). Derrida discusses the 
significance of this oath scene in his book Specters of Marx: 
the pledge oƌ the pƌoŵise ;the oath, if oŶe pƌefeƌs: ͞sǁeaƌ!͟Ϳ, the originary performativity 
that does not conform to pre-existing conventions, unlike all the performatives analyzed by 
the theoreticians of speech acts, but whose force of rupture produces institution or the 
constitution, the law itself, [...] Violence of the law before the law and before meaning, 
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violence that interrupts time, disarticulates it, dislodges it, displaces it out of its natural 
lodgiŶg: ͞out of joiŶt.͟ [...] The pledge is giǀeŶ heƌe aŶd Ŷoǁ, eǀeŶ ďefoƌe, peƌhaps, a 
decision confirms it. It thus responds without delay to the demand of justice. 
 
(1994: 36-7, my emphasis in bold) 
Derrida says that the swear scene in Hamlet immediately responds to the call for justice as it 
produces the event of swearing; however, it does not neutralise the event. It produces the event in 
uttering and performing the oath. Yet, at the same time it cannot neutralise the event, it cannot 
legitimise the institution of the law, as it invents an oath that is before the law. The oath called for is 
self-negating as it demands the speakers to utter a vow of silence, to speak in order to promise not 
to speak. The aim of the event is to ensure the event remains a secret. This is why the swear scene is 
uŶlike aŶǇ aŶalǇsed ďǇ ͚theoƌetiĐiaŶs of speeĐh aĐts͛, it is Ŷot ŵeƌelǇ legitiŵisiŶg the peƌfoƌŵatiǀe of 
swearing, but creates a rupture with the institutioŶ. ͚The juƌidiĐal is at ǁoƌk iŶ the peƌfoƌŵatiǀe͛ 
(Derrida, 2000: 467): this oath defies a judicial system that cannot yet account for this type of oath 
and by swearing in this scene Horatio and Marcellus produce something that breaks from the 
existing law and invents the law. They are entreated to remain silent upon seeing the ghost as they 
have witnessed the impossible. Horatio and Marcellus do not possess a full comprehension of the 
event, or of the significance of the assignment of silence that they are asked to swear to. Despite this 
they both vow to remain silent. Thus, as Derrida points out, the performative of swearing an oath 
here responds immediately to the demand for justice. That is not to say that in so swearing they 
have attained justice, but that in swearing, without understanding or questioning the demand to 
͚sǁeaƌ͛, theǇ ƌespoŶd to a Đall foƌ justiĐe. HeŶĐe Deƌƌida laďels this oath the ͚oƌigiŶaƌǇ 
peƌfoƌŵatiǀitǇ͛ (1994: 36). 
Despite the divided opinion between Austin and Derrida, as a ƌesult of Deƌƌida͛s ĐƌitiĐisŵ of 
Austin, it is interesting to note how both philosophers share a similar concept. Derrida criticises 
Austin for assuming that there is an internal spirituality. However, although he criticises him for 
assuming there is soŵethiŶg ͚iŶǁaƌd aŶd spiƌitual͛ ǁhiĐh is uŶkŶoǁaďle, iŶ Specters of Marx, Derrida 
gives the following definition of a spectre:  
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[...] the specter is a paradoxical incorporation, the becoming-body, a certain phenomenal 
and carnal form of the spirit. It beĐoŵes, ƌatheƌ, soŵe ͞thiŶg͟ that ƌeŵaiŶs diffiĐult to 
name: neither soul nor body, and both one and the other. For it is flesh and phenomenality 
that give to the spirit its spectral apparition, but which disappear right away in the 
apparition, in the very coming of the revenant or the return of the specter. There is 
something disappeared, departed in the apparition itself as reapparition of the departed. 
The spirit and the specter are not the same thing, and we will have to sharpen this 
difference; but as for what they have in common, one does not know what it is, what it is 
presently. It is something that one does not know, precisely, and one does not know if 
precisely it is, if it exists, if it responds to a name and corresponds to an essence. One does 
not know: not out of ignorance, but because this non-object, this non-present present, this 
being-there of an absent or departed one no longer belongs to knowledge. 
(1994: 5) 
The ǁoƌd ͚spiƌit͛ is used thƌee tiŵes iŶ his atteŵpt to defiŶe the speĐtƌe. Deƌƌida makes the same 
presumption which he criticises Austin for; that there is something inward and spiritual that can act 
as the foundation for something physical. When Derrida defines the spectre he says that it is the 
becoming-body of the spirit. The spectre is a corporealisation of the spirit, the difficulty in 
distinguishing between the spirit and the spectre derives from the unknowability of spirituality. The 
spiƌitual iŶteŶtioŶs of a peƌsoŶ do Ŷot ͚[ďeloŶg] to kŶoǁledge͛, ďut, despite ďeiŶg uŶkŶoǁaďle, 
Derrida argues that the spectre is an embodiment of this spirit. Importantly, Derrida rightly points 
out, the ͚spiƌit aŶd the speĐteƌ aƌe Ŷot the saŵe thiŶg͛. PeƌfoƌŵatiǀitǇ is speĐtƌal; the speĐtƌe is 
dependent upon a spirit for it to have any form of existence. For Derrida, it is through the spectral 
that we can gain access to the spiritual. Thus, performativity is spectral: as Austin has it, it is the 
actual embodiment of something spiritual, which, as Derrida has it, is spectrality. 
IŶ giǀiŶg the ͚iŶǁaƌd and spiritual͛ ;AustiŶ, 1976: 9) intention to remain silent a verbal 
existence, Horatio and Marcellus create a ghost which will haunt them. Uttering the oath produces a 
speĐtƌe, a ͚spiƌitual shaĐkle͛ (Austin, 1976: 10) is forged and the inward and spiritual is made 
outward and visible. The performative produces a spectre which will haunt the actions of the men 
thƌoughout the ƌest of the plaǇ. The speĐtƌal peƌfoƌŵatiǀe of the oath Đauses a ͚rupture͛ (Derrida, 
1994: 37) in time. The oath spoken here and now in response to the call for justice will alter the 
course of action in the future and upon reflection has already been at work. Even though Horatio 
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and Marcellus have only just performed the oath in this scene, they have spiritually committed 
loyalty to Hamlet before this scene, as they have already been keeping the presence of the ghost a 
seĐƌet fƌoŵ the ƌest of the Đouƌt iŶ faǀouƌ of loǇaltǇ to Haŵlet. This ͚oƌigiŶaƌǇ peƌfoƌŵatiǀe͛ 
produces a rift, dislodging everything that has come before it and all that will follow it. The oath 
theƌefoƌe shaƌes pƌopeƌties ǁith the ghost of Haŵlet͛s fatheƌ, ǁho eŵeƌges fƌoŵ the past to 
demand commitment to a future course of action in order to set the present to rights, and who thus, 
for Derrida, puts the time out of joint. The performative of the oath is spectral as the ghost too is 
spectral. My term spectral anachrony, that I again propose to use here, characterises this effect that 
the production of a spectre (in this case by way of a performative) has on time. A spectre does not 
adhere to a linear chronology and its functioning can only be recognised retrospectively; as was also 
the case with the spectre of interiorisation and the spectre of justice, which is once again at work 
here in the oath scene.  
Derrida only looks at the oath that Horatio and Marcellus swear to. But, Hamlet swears an 
oath as ǁell. This oath foƌŵs the ďasis of all of Haŵlet͛s aĐtioŶs folloǁiŶg the eǀeŶt. Afteƌ his 
ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶ ǁith the ghost Haŵlet saǇs: ͚Noǁ to ŵǇ ǁoƌd./ It is ͚Adieu, adieu, ƌeŵeŵďeƌ ŵe.͛/ I 
haǀe sǁoƌŶ͛t͛ ;Hamlet, 1.5.110-112). What is it exactly that Hamlet has sworn to? What is his 
͚ǁoƌd͛? Heƌe is a ƋuotatioŶ fƌoŵ Haŵlet͛s ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶ ǁith the ghost:  
HAMLET: Speak, I am bound to hear.  
GHOST:  So art thou to revenge when thou shalt hear. 
[...] 
  If thou didst ever thy dear father love –  
HAMLET:  O God! 
GHOST:  Revenge his foul and most unnatural murder! 
HAMLET:  Murder! 
GHOST:  Murder most foul – as in the best it is –  
  But this most foul, strange and unnatural.  
HAMLET:  Haste ŵe to kŶoǁ͛t that I ǁith ǁiŶgs as sǁift 
  As meditation or the thoughts of love 
  May sweep to my revenge. 
GHOST:  I find thee apt. 
(Hamlet, 1.5.6-7, 23-31)  
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Before Hamlet has agreed to be the administrator of revenge the ghost tells him he is bound to 
avenge him. Vengeance is not optional, whether he swears to avenge his father or not Hamlet must 
murder his Uncle.5 When the ghost begins to speak of his murder Hamlet interrupts him. This 
linguistic break with conversational turn-taking shows that Hamlet anticipates what the ghost is 
aďout to saǇ. As Attƌidge tells us, ǁhat the ghost tells Haŵlet ͚is aŶd is Ŷot Ŷeǁs to hiŵ͛ ;ϮϬϬϭ: 176). 
Before Hamlet has been told that Claudius murdered his father he already suspected it to be true, as 
demonstrated by Hamlet͛s eǆĐlaŵatoƌǇ lateƌ iŶ the sĐeŶe: ͚O ŵǇ pƌophetiĐ soul! MǇ uŶĐle!͛ (Hamlet, 
1.5.40). After the ghost demands revenge for his murder, Hamlet repeats ďaĐk ͚Muƌdeƌ!͛ as this is an 
exclamation uttered in shock. However, it is not a shock at hearing something which he had not 
previously conceived, but one that is uttered in the shock of having confirmed that which he already 
knew. Note the spectral anachrony here; the spectre of justice, that requires the state to be set to 
right, is already at work in Hamlet͛s ŵiŶd as he suspeĐts his uŶĐle of ͚foul plaǇ͛ ;Hamlet, 1.2.254).6 It 
is only here and now, once the ghost has confirmed his suspicions, that the spectre of justice can be 
recognised as having already been at work.  
Hamlet next asks the ghost to tell him ǁhat happeŶed so he ŵaǇ ͚sǁeep͛ to his ƌeǀeŶge. 
This is the poiŶt at ǁhiĐh Haŵlet sǁeaƌs to aǀeŶge his fatheƌ͛s death: ͚Haste ŵe to kŶoǁ͛t that I 
ǁith ǁiŶgs as sǁift/ As ŵeditatioŶ oƌ the thoughts of loǀe/ MaǇ sǁeep to ŵǇ ƌeǀeŶge͛ ;Hamlet, 
1.5.28-30). Even iŶ saǇiŶg he ǁill eǆaĐt ǀeŶgeaŶĐe ͚sǁiftlǇ͛ Haŵlet alƌeadǇ delaǇs the pƌoŵise ǁith 
flowery rhetoric. Hamlet does not convincingly verbally commit himself to the task of vengeance, 
which regardless of his own volition is a task he must fulfil. Yet, he lateƌ adaŵaŶtlǇ states: ͚I haǀe 
sǁoƌŶ͛t͛, despite the faĐt that it is Ŷot appaƌeŶt ǁhat it is that he has sǁoƌŶ to. IŶ How to do Things 
with Words (1976) Austin characterises the problem of identifying the interior commitment to a 
performative that is necessary for its felicitousness by quoting from Hippolytus. He quotes it in 
                                                          
5 With reference to chapter 2 let us remind ourselves at this point that, although vengeance is asked of him, 
Hamlet rejects this task in favour of seeking justice. 
6 UpoŶ leaƌŶiŶg fƌoŵ Hoƌatio that the ghost of his fatheƌ has ďeeŶ sighted, Haŵlet deĐlaƌes: ͚MǇ fatheƌ͛s spiƌit 
– iŶ Aƌŵs! All is Ŷot ǁell; / I douďt soŵe foul plaǇ͛ ;Hamlet, 1.2.253-254). 
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tƌaŶslatioŶ as: ͚ŵǇ toŶgue sǁoƌe to, ďut ŵǇ heaƌt ;oƌ ŵiŶd oƌ otheƌ ďaĐkstage aƌtisteͿ did Ŷot͛ 
(Austin, 1976: 9-ϭϬͿ. The pƌoďleŵ iŶ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg Haŵlet͛s oath is a ƌeǀeƌsal of this phƌase. For 
whatever it is that Hamlet has sworn to, he has sworn it inwardly and without giving a clear 
utterance to it. In comparison to Horatio and Marcellus who are asked to repeatedly swear to their 
oath of silence, and place their hand on a sword to do so, Hamlet neither makes a performative, nor 
a performance, of that which he swears to and does not directly outline what the oath is that he has 
made. His heart has sworn to, but his tongue has not. Hamlet possesses the inward and spiritual 
commitment that Austin refers to, but lacks the utterance of a committed performative to produce a 
speĐtƌe oƌ ͚spiƌitual shaĐkle͛ (Austin, 1976: 10). The spectre of his oath to vengeance is, as his 
spectre of mourning, one that continues to exist only from within. In doing this Hamlet relocates the 
performative from the public to the private realm. In uttering words publically when swearing, as 
Hoƌatio aŶd MaƌĐellus do: ͚IŶ faith, ŵǇ loƌd, Ŷot I͛ ;Hamlet, 1.5.145), they are placed under the 
judgement of an external audience as to whether or not they will prove to be felicitous in acting on 
the performative (i.e. later fulfilling that which they have sworn to do).  
 
Yet, as Hamlet does not observably announce to a public audience an oath that he has 
sworn, it is only himself that ĐaŶ deteƌŵiŶe the feliĐitǇ of his peƌfoƌŵatiǀe. The ͚ĐoŶsĐious iŶteŶtioŶ͛ 
ǁhiĐh Haŵlet has sǁoƌŶ to is Ŷot eǀeŶ ͚totallǇ pƌeseŶt aŶd iŵŵediatelǇ tƌaŶspaƌeŶt to itself͛ 
;Deƌƌida, ϭϵϴϴ: ϭϴͿ, let aloŶe to otheƌs. Haŵlet͛s task of peƌfoƌŵatiǀitǇ is Ŷot only to comply with 
what he has sworn to do, but to discover the meaning of that which he has sworn to himself. In 
ĐoŵpaƌisoŶ to Hoƌatio aŶd MaƌĐellus ǁho uŶƋuestioŶiŶglǇ ƌespoŶd to Haŵlet͛s ĐoŵŵaŶd, Ŷot to 
speak of what they have seen, Hamlet unconvincinglǇ sǁeaƌs to aǀeŶge his fatheƌ: ͚Haste ŵe to 
kŶoǁ͛t that I [...] MaǇ sǁeep to ŵǇ ƌeǀeŶge͛ ;Hamlet, 1.5.28-30) and later questions what is asked of 
hiŵ. Hoƌatio aŶd MaƌĐellus sǁeaƌ ͚iŶ faith͛ (Hamlet, 1.5.145), they do not understand and swear 
anyway; whereas Hamlet swears, but needs to question and make sense of what he has sworn to 
before he can act upon it. Derrida recognises the oath that Horatio and Marcellus make as an 
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͚oƌigiŶaƌǇ peƌfoƌŵatiǀitǇ͛ that ͚ƌespoŶds ǁithout delaǇ to the deŵaŶd of justiĐe͛ ;ϭ994: 36-37). 
Hoǁeǀeƌ, as Haŵlet͛s oath is Ŷot ǀeƌďalised it does Ŷot iŵŵediatelǇ ƌespoŶd to the deŵaŶd foƌ 
justiĐe; iŶstead Haŵlet͛s ƌespoŶse to the ghost͛s deŵaŶd foƌ vengeance is an internal commitment 
to seek the attainment of justice. 
 
In lecture XII Austin comes up with five general classes of performatives with illocutionary 
foƌĐe. AŵoŶgst these aƌe ͚Đoŵŵissiǀes͛, aŶd he pƌoǀides a list of eǆaŵples of these ǁhiĐh iŶĐlude: 
͚pƌoŵise͛, ǀoǁ͛, ͚pledge ŵǇself͛ aŶd ͚sǁeaƌ͛ ;ϭϵϳϲ: ϭϱϳ-158). In our analysis of the ͚sǁeaƌ͛ sĐeŶe iŶ 
Act 1 scene 5 then we were already concerned with the commissive performative. Although Austin 
does Ŷot list this as aŶ eǆaŵple, ǁe ǁill Ŷoǁ look at ͚I shall oďeǇ͛ as a Đoŵŵissiǀe performative, as 
promising to obey in Hamlet is a recurring act that is performed by multiple dramatis personae. 
AustiŶ saǇs: ͚The ǁhole poiŶt of a Đoŵŵissiǀe is to Đoŵŵit the speakeƌ to a ĐeƌtaiŶ Đouƌse of aĐtioŶ͛ 
(1976: 157). In Act 1 scene 2 Gertrude solicits Hamlet not to go to Wittenberg, to which Hamlet 
ƌeplies: ͚I shall iŶ all ŵǇ ďest oďeǇ Ǉou, ŵadaŵ͛ ;Hamlet, 1.2.120). In uttering this commissive 
performative Hamlet submits his will to the desires of his mother and commits to acting in her 
interests, as opposed to his own. He says he will stay in Denmark and he does – Hamlet fulfils the 
performative so we can retrospectively deem this felicitous. Hamlet remains true to his word here. 
What Hamlet does in giving up his autonomy is to place himself in a position of performative 
powerlessness. He submits to the peƌsuasiǀe poǁeƌ of his ŵotheƌ: ͚Let Ŷot thǇ ŵotheƌ lose heƌ 
pƌaǇeƌs, Haŵlet. / I pƌaǇ thee staǇ ǁith us, go Ŷot to WitteŶďeƌg͛ ;Hamlet, 1.2.118-119). He acts 
upoŶ heƌ iŶteƌests aŶd Ŷot his oǁŶ. Haŵlet͛s iŶaĐtioŶ iŶ Ŷot goiŶg to WitteŶďeƌg is aĐtually a course 
of action itself. Thus through inaction here, Hamlet is actually taking an action approved by his 
mother. Later, the ghost comes along and commands Hamlet to avenge him as Hamlet is once again 
called upon to produce a commissive performative, to swear to avenge his father. IŶ ͚The Tiŵe is 
Out of JoiŶt͛ Deƌƌida pƌoposes that, afteƌ this eŶĐouŶteƌ ǁith the ghost, Haŵlet ͚Ŷo loŶgeƌ kŶoǁs 
ǁhat to do aŶd ďeĐoŵes [...] ŵeƌelǇ a poǁeƌless ǁitŶess͛ ;ϭϵϵϱ: ϯϰͿ. Although Haŵlet is asked oŶĐe 
47 | P a g e  
 
more to submit his own volition, this time he is required to act upon the command; whereas, his 
mother made a passive request of him to stay in Denmark. Hamlet could easily fulfil the request of 
his mother as it did not require him to take action – in his passive state of not doing something (i.e. 
to not go to WitteŶďeƌgͿ he ǁas doiŶg ǁhat ǁas asked of hiŵ. Hoǁeǀeƌ, iŶ suďŵittiŶg to his fatheƌ͛s 
demand and once again placing himself in a position of performative powerlessness, Hamlet is now 
required to take action in order to comply. In swearing vengeance he has committed himself to a 
course of action that requires action. Hamlet does not possess the power or authority to act of his 
oǁŶ ǀolitioŶ. This ŵaǇ seeŵ pessiŵistiĐ, ďut Deƌƌida offeƌs us the folloǁiŶg optiŵisŵ: ͚There is 
ethiĐs pƌeĐiselǇ ǁheƌe I aŵ iŶ peƌfoƌŵatiǀe poǁeƌlessŶess͛ ;ϮϬϬϬ: ϰϲϳͿ. BǇ ďeiŶg iŶ a poǁeƌless 
state Hamlet is able to question the authority of the other. To be in the position of performative 
power requires absolute certainty and commitment, doubt is seen as a weakness. However, from his 
position of powerlessness Hamlet is able to interrogate the authority of the ghost and to critique the 
judicial system that functions on vengeance. In criticising this Hamlet opens a discussion that 
contains the possibility of justice.  
 
AustiŶ͛s pƌeƌeƋuisite, that theƌe ought to ďe aŶ iŶǁaƌd, spiƌitual ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt to a 
peƌfoƌŵatiǀe iŶ oƌdeƌ foƌ it to ďe feliĐitous, is eǆeŵplified iŶ Haŵlet͛s ƌetoƌt to his ŵotheƌ. WheŶ 
Geƌtƌude asks Haŵlet ǁhǇ his fatheƌ͛s death ͚seeŵs͛ so paƌtiĐulaƌ ǁith hiŵ, Haŵlet saǇs his displaǇs 
of gƌief ŵaǇ: ͚iŶdeed ͚seeŵ͛,/ Foƌ theǇ aƌe aĐtioŶs that a ŵaŶ ŵight plaǇ,/ But I haǀe that ǁithiŶ 
ǁhiĐh passes shoǁ,/ These ďut the tƌappiŶgs aŶd the suits of ǁoe͛ ;Hamlet, 1.2.83-86). Here Hamlet 
attests to his interior, spiritual commitment to his performance of grief.7 However, following 
Deƌƌida͛s liŶe of aƌguŵeŶt, that the iŶteƌioƌ suďjeĐtiǀitǇ of aŶ iŶdiǀidual ĐaŶŶot ďe kŶoǁŶ, leads 
performativity to the following possible conclusion: 
 
                                                          
7 As we began to discuss with regards to the spectral anachrony of an interior subjectivity in chapter 1 (see 
pages 18-19).  
48 | P a g e  
 
͞PeƌfoƌŵatiǀitǇ,͟ it Ŷoǁ appeaƌs ŵeaŶs, aŵoŶg otheƌ thiŶgs, the assuŵptioŶ that huŵaŶ 
beings have no innate selfhood or subjectivity but become what they are through more or 
less forced repetition of a certain role.  
(Miller, 2009: 146) 
Miller proposes that it is our actions that define us, and as these are outward and visible (and 
therefore knowable) we must judge a person based on their actions alone. This reading suggests 
ƌeŵoǀiŶg the pƌoďleŵatiĐ ĐoŶĐept of aŶ ͚iŶŶate selfhood͛ fƌoŵ peƌfoƌŵatiǀitǇ altogether. However, 
this ĐoŶtƌadiĐts ǁhat Haŵlet attests to ǁheŶ he Đlaiŵs to haǀe ͚that ǁithiŶ ǁhiĐh passes shoǁ͛ 
(Hamlet, 1.2.85). Despite Deƌƌida͛s iŶitial disappƌoǀal of the idea that the peƌfoƌŵatiǀe ƌeƋuiƌes aŶ 
inward commitment, and therefore an interior suďjeĐtiǀitǇ, iŶ his essaǇ ͚“igŶatuƌe EǀeŶt CoŶteǆt͛ iŶ 
1971, by the time he is using performativity to discuss Hamlet in the 1990s, Derrida has begun to 
deploǇ the teƌŵ ͚speĐtƌalitǇ͛ iŶ oƌdeƌ to ĐoŵďiŶe the peƌfoƌŵatiǀe ǁith iŶteƌioƌitǇ, ǁithout haǀiŶg to 
fully endorse subjectivity. Let us here expand upon the earlier distinction Derrida made, that the 
͚spiƌit aŶd the speĐteƌ aƌe Ŷot the saŵe thiŶg͛ ;ϭϵϵϰ: ϱͿ: the speĐtƌe is the ͚ďeĐoŵiŶg-ďodǇ͛ aŶd it is 
through this spectral corporealisation, that the inward and spiritual can be given an outward 
presence. Therefore, the spectral is linked to the outside world as the ego is connected to the id – it 
is outwardly perceptible whilst still in connection with an internal spirit. Whereas spirituality, in the 
way Austin uses the term, is solely internal and has no way of being accessed by the external world.  
 
In Hamlet the play-within-the-play provides another example of how the performative is 
spectral, as it also is in the oath scene. Surprisingly Derrida does not write about the play-within-the-
play, which is interesting with regards to performativity. In this scene the player queen promises to 
ƌeŵaiŶ loǇal to heƌ husďaŶd aŶd Ŷot to ƌeŵaƌƌǇ afteƌ his death: ͚If onĐe I ďe a ǁidoǁ eǀer I ďe a ǁife͛ 
(Hamlet, ϯ.Ϯ.ϮϭϳͿ, this peƌfoƌŵatiǀe is, as the plaǇeƌ kiŶg Ŷotes: ͚deeply sǁorn͛ (Hamlet, 3.2.219). 
The player queen produces an Austinian spiritual shackle as she puts on record her determination to 
remain loyal to her husband. Whilst Derrida neglected this scene, current Derridean scholars have 
taken up the task of discussing it. Nicholas Royle refers to it as: ͚a strangely private-public theatre, a 
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soƌt of iŶteƌioƌ ŵagiĐ shoǁ that passes shoǁ, the eǆposuƌe oƌ eǆsĐƌiptioŶ of a ĐhaƌaĐteƌ͛s otheƌǁise 
secret and unkŶoǁŶ thoughts aŶd feeliŶgs͛ (2012: 144). EĐhoiŶg Haŵlet͛s ƌefeƌeŶĐe to aŶ iŶteƌioƌ 
suďjeĐtiǀitǇ ;as he has that ǁithiŶ ǁhiĐh ͚passes shoǁ͛Ϳ, ‘oǇle͛s iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ heƌe is faƌ fƌoŵ 
Milleƌ͛s allusioŶ to aŶ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of peƌfoƌŵatiǀitǇ that is detaĐhed fƌoŵ aŶ ͚iŶŶate selfhood͛ 
;ϮϬϬϵ: ϭϰϲͿ, aŶd faƌ fƌoŵ AustiŶ͛s deŶouŶĐeŵeŶt of the peƌfoƌŵatiǀe ďeiŶg: ͚in a peculiar way 
holloǁ oƌ ǀoid if said ďǇ aŶ aĐtoƌ oŶ the stage͛ ;ϭϵϳϲ: 22). What Royle suggests is that the 
performatives produced in the play-within-the-play in Hamlet actually enable access to the inward 
spirituality of those outside the fictional confines of the play. Or to put it another way, the spectral 
production of fictional performatives enables an exploration of spirituality. Milleƌ͛s eaƌlieƌ Ƌuote 
theŶ ĐaŶ ďe aligŶed ǁith Deƌƌida͛s peƌspeĐtiǀe iŶ the 1970s. However, as Derrida further explored 
the idea of spectrality his understanding of performativity has also altered accordingly, and it is from 
a post-1990s Derridean perspective that Royle discusses Hamlet. In addition to Royle, Cixous also 
adds that: 
To make truth while resorting to dramatic metaphor, to produce effects of unveiling without 
tearing the veil, is the very art of the theatre-within-the-theatre which Shakespeare will have 
brought to incandescence: through evocation, through condensation and displacement, 
through spectral figuration, to make the trace of the secret spring to light. 
(Cixous, 2012: 4) 
 
The play-within-the-plaǇ pƌoduĐes a ͚speĐtƌal figuƌatioŶ͛. Thƌough the peƌfoƌŵatiǀes in The 
Mousetrap the spirits of Claudius, Hamlet and Gertrude are revealed. The initial dumb-show re-
creates the scenario of the murder of a king by pouring poison into his ear. In re-creating the scene 
of his fatheƌ͛s ŵuƌdeƌ Haŵlet ǁishes to eǆpose Claudius͛ guilt aŶd thus: ͚BǇ iŶdiƌeĐtioŶs [to] fiŶd 
diƌeĐtioŶs out͛ ;Hamlet, 2.1.63), to quote Polonius. Nevertheless, this is dangerous as until this point 
Haŵlet͛s kŶoǁledge of Claudius͛ guilt has ƌeŵaiŶed a seĐƌet: ďǇ puttiŶg oŶ this peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe Haŵlet 
is making his secret knowledge apparent to the murderer. Though this is a dangerous pursuit, it is 
necessary for Hamlet to stage the play-within-the-plaǇ, iŶ oƌdeƌ to: ͚siŵultaŶeouslǇ [test] the 
Ghost͛s hoŶestǇ aŶd Claudius͛s ĐoŶsĐieŶĐe͛ ;Caǀell, ϮϬϬϯ: ϭϳϵͿ.  
 
50 | P a g e  
 
Austin tells us that a performative will be ͚in a peculiar way hollow or void if said by an actor 
oŶ the stage͛ ;ϭϵϳϲ: 22),  ďut despite the faĐt that the plaǇeƌ ƋueeŶ͛s peƌfoƌŵatiǀe is fiĐtioŶal it 
ƌeǀeals Haŵlet͛s spiƌit as he displaǇs to his ŵotheƌ his dismay at having seen his mother remarry, 
which in turn allows Hamlet to ask his mother her thoughts on the matter, to which she responds: 
͚The ladǇ doth pƌotest too ŵuĐh, ŵethiŶks͛ ;Hamlet, ϯ.Ϯ.ϮϮϰͿ. Geƌtƌude͛s spiƌit is ƌeǀealed ďǇ ǁaǇ of 
the fictional performative. Not only does The Mousetrap ƌeǀeal Haŵlet͛s aŶd Geƌtƌude͛s iŶǁaƌd 
spirit, but it also divulges the spirit of Claudius. Witnessing the spectre of the play-within-the-play 
causes Claudius to utter the exercitive performative: ͚Giǀe ŵe soŵe light, aǁaǇ͛ ;Hamlet, 3.2.261). 
Thƌough this ĐoŵŵaŶd Claudius ƌeǀeals his guilt, ĐoŶfiƌŵs Haŵlet͛s suspiĐioŶs, and verifies the 
ǀeƌaĐitǇ of the ghost͛s stoƌǇ. The peƌfoƌŵatiǀe is ďouŶd up ǁith the speĐtƌal aŶd is aŶ outǁaƌd 
display of the inward spirit; even fictional performatives have the capacity to touch upon the spirit, 
as the plaǇeƌ ƋueeŶ͛s peƌfoƌŵatiǀe ƌeǀeals the spiƌit of Haŵlet, Geƌtƌude aŶd Claudius. 
Performatives are spectral as they are connected to, and reveal, that which is inward and spiritual. 
Austin outlines that the performative requires an interior subjectivity to be felicitous; however, it is 
only by way of a Derridean conception of spectrality that it is possible to bear witness to the inward 
spirit which the performative is connected to. 
 
The play-within-the-play does more than to offer a direct reflection of actions that have 
occurred, and it is for this reason that it cannot strictly be deemed an example of mis-en-abyme, as 
the person that murders the king in The Mousetrap is not the king͛s ďƌotheƌ ďut ͚oŶe LuĐiaŶus, 
Ŷepheǁ to the kiŶg͛ ;Hamlet, 3.2.237). The play-within-the-plaǇ is a pƌoduĐtioŶ of Haŵlet͛s spiƌit, 
ƌeǀealiŶg Ŷot oŶlǇ his kŶoǁledge of Claudius͛ guilt, ďut also his ͚fantasy͛ ;Caǀell, ϮϬϬϯ: 183) and 
required task to murder his uncle.8 Although Derrida does not discuss the play-within-the-play in 
Hamlet directly, he does indirectly refer to it in such a way that implies our understanding of spectral 
                                                          
8 I use ͚faŶtasǇ͛ heƌe iŶ the seŶse used ďǇ Caǀell ǁheŶ he saǇs ͚ǁe look at the duŵď-shoǁ as Haŵlet͛s 
iŶǀeŶtioŶ, let ŵe saǇ his faŶtasǇ,͛ ;Caǀell, ϮϬϬϯ: ϭϴϮ-183). 
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anachrony. The play-within-the-plaǇ is iŶ a paƌt a ŶeĐessaƌǇ ƌeĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ of Claudius͛ iŶitial Đƌiŵe 
of murder in order to test the veracity of the ghost. Derrida tells us:  
There is tragedy [...] on the condition of this [...] spectral anteriority of the crime – the crime 
of the other, a misdeed whose event and reality, whose truth can never present themselves 
in flesh and blood, but can only allow themselves to be presuŵed, ƌeĐoŶstƌuĐted, faŶtasized͛  
(1994: 24, my emphasis in bold) 
The play-within-the-play is both a reconstruction of the initial crime and a representation of 
Haŵlet͛s faŶtasǇ to aǀeŶge his fatheƌ. The peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe of the plaǇ is a ƌe-enactment of that which 
came before, in this way it is anachronic, as well as spectral as this reproduction endeavours to 
haunt Claudius and remind him of his crime.  
 
IŶ this speĐtƌal deŵoŶstƌatioŶ of Haŵlet͛s iŶteƌioƌ suďjeĐtiǀitǇ the plaǇeƌ kiŶg speaks the 
words: ͚I do believe you think what now you speak./But what we do determine oft we break./ 
Purpose is but the slave to memory͛ (Hamlet, 3.2.180-182). Not only does this refer to the player 
ƋueeŶ͛s deteƌŵiŶatioŶ Ŷot to ŵaƌƌǇ agaiŶ oŶĐe heƌ husďaŶd has died, ďut ǀeƌǇ poiŶtedlǇ ƌefeƌs to 
Haŵlet͛s oǁŶ iŶaĐtioŶ. The plaǇ pƌoduĐes a speĐtƌe that eǆposes Haŵlet͛s spirit, which he earlier 
eluĐidated iŶ the AĐt ϯ sĐeŶe ϭ soliloƋuǇ: ͚the Ŷatiǀe hue of ƌesolutioŶ/ Is siĐklied o͛eƌ ǁith the pale 
Đast of thought,/ AŶd eŶteƌpƌises of gƌeat pitĐh aŶd ŵoŵeŶt/ [...] lose the Ŷaŵe of aĐtioŶ͛ ;Hamlet, 
3.1.83-87). The play-within-the-plaǇ is speĐtƌal aŶd ƌeǀeals Haŵlet͛s haŵaƌtia ǁhiĐh is to thiŶk too 
ŵuĐh. WheŶ the plaǇeƌ kiŶg saǇs ͚[p]uƌpose is ďut the slaǀe to ŵeŵoƌǇ͛ it ƌeĐalls the ghost͛s paƌtiŶg 
ǁoƌds to Haŵlet ͚adieu, adieu, ƌeŵeŵďeƌ ŵe͛ ;Hamlet, 1.5.91). By penning lines for the play Hamlet 
is remembering his father and offering himself a spectral display of his fantasy, a nephew murdering 
a king, in order to motivate him to take action in his revenge.   
 
As swearing an oath is a performative, prayer is also a performative.9 After prematurely 
ceasing the performance of The Mousetrap Claudius retires to pray. In his final lecture in How to do 
                                                          
9 The prayer scene was also discussed at length with regards to justice in chapter 2; see pages 29 and 30 for a 
recapitulation. 
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Things with Words AustiŶ laďels ͚pƌaǇ͛ as aŶ eǆeƌĐitiǀe: ͚AŶ eǆeƌĐitiǀe is the giǀiŶg of a deĐisioŶ iŶ 
favour of or against a certain course of aĐtioŶ, oƌ adǀoĐaĐǇ of it͛ ;ϭϵϳϲ: 155). It is interesting to 
Đoŵpaƌe Claudius͛ pƌaǇeƌ to the oath Hoƌatio aŶd MaƌĐellus ŵake eaƌlieƌ iŶ the plaǇ. The oath theǇ 
make is self-negating, as they speak the words of the oath in order to take a vow to silence. On the 
suƌfaĐe Claudius͛ pƌaǇeƌ is siŵilaƌlǇ self-negating, as he prays in the knowledge that his prayer is 
hollow.10 Claudius ďegiŶs ďǇ saǇiŶg: ͚PƌaǇ ĐaŶ I Ŷot,͛ ;Hamlet, 3.3.38). This prayer-less prayer 
becomes even more ironic as Hamlet steps in at the moment where Claudius has knelt down, and 
the protagonist contemplates murdering him. However, he decides not to because he does not wish 
to ͚take hiŵ iŶ the puƌgiŶg of his soul/ WheŶ he is fit aŶd seasoŶed foƌ his passage͛ ;Hamlet, 3.3.84-
85). Hamlet has walked in and seen the outward performance of Claudius kneeling down and based 
upoŶ ǁitŶessiŶg this Đhooses Ŷot to take ƌeǀeŶge, as he does Ŷot ǁish to seŶd his uŶĐle͛s soul to 
heaven. The audience, who are in the privileged position to have heaƌd Claudius͛ soliloƋuǇ pƌioƌ to 
Haŵlet͛s aƌƌiǀal, aƌe aǁaƌe that although Claudius does the aĐtioŶ of kŶeeliŶg doǁŶ he does Ŷot 
iŶǁaƌdlǇ Đoŵŵit to the pƌaǇeƌ. WhiĐh is ƌeǀealed iŶ Claudius͛ ƌhǇŵiŶg Đouplet that eŶds the sĐeŶe 
after Hamlet has left the stage: ͚MǇ ǁoƌds flǇ up, ŵǇ thoughts ƌeŵaiŶ ďeloǁ. / Woƌds ǁithout 
thoughts Ŷeǀeƌ to heaǀeŶ go͛ ;Hamlet, 3.3. 97-ϵϴͿ. Claudius hiŵself highlights AustiŶ͛s issue ǁith 
performativity. For a performative to be felicitous it requires a spiritual commitment to fulfilling the 
Đouƌse of aĐtioŶ that the peƌfoƌŵatiǀe is supposed to Đoŵŵit to: ͚Woƌds ǁithout thoughts Ŷeǀeƌ to 
heaǀeŶ go͛. Without this spiƌitual ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt Claudius ďelieǀes that the prayer is unsuccessful. 
However, in one important respect, the prayer is successful. Claudius still carries out the 
outward performance by kneeling down to pray and through this action Hamlet sees Claudius at 
prayer and because of this decides not to kill him. Although the prayer seems self-negating, as 
Claudius does not commit to a course of action that will save his soul, because he performs the 
action of kneeling the prayer still saves him from death. The performance of prayer, and 
                                                          
10 I applǇ this teƌŵ iŶ the seŶse that AustiŶ uses it ǁheŶ he states that: ͚a peƌfoƌŵatiǀe utteƌaŶĐe ǁill, foƌ 
example, be in a peculiar way, holloǁ oƌ ǀoid if said ďǇ aŶ aĐtoƌ oŶ the stage͛ ;ϭϵϳϲ: 22). 
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performativity itself, operates independently of the intentions of the individual. In a chapter entitled 
͚Deƌƌida͛s “peĐial TheoƌǇ of PeƌfoƌŵatiǀitǇ͛ Milleƌ tells us ďoth that: ͚a speeĐh aĐt ŵaǇ haǀe 
uŶiŶteŶded ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes͛ aŶd that it ͚ŵaǇ, hoǁeǀeƌ, aĐt oŶ its oǁŶ to do soŵethiŶg Ƌuite diffeƌeŶt 
from what the speakeƌ ŵeaŶs to do͛ ;ϮϬϬϵ: 165). This is precisely what we see in the prayer scene; 
Claudius is aware that although it looks as though he is praying, because he is kneeling, he knows 
that he cannot pray for forgiveness when he still possesses the effects his crime gained him. Yet, by 
kneeling to pray Claudius produces the unintended consequence of saving his own life, as it prevents 
his nephew from murdering him. The prayer scene functions in opposition to the aforementioned 
oath scene. In the scene where Horatio and Marcellus swear a vow of silence to both King Hamlet 
and Prince Hamlet, the performative utterance of the oath produced a spectre that haunts their 
ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt to this. Hoǁeǀeƌ, as Claudius͛ pƌaǇeƌ laĐks a spiƌitual ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt it is holloǁ aŶd Ŷo 
spectre is produced. Whereas the ghost is a spectre – a spirit without a body, Claudius is the 
opposite, a body without a spirit. Conversely, that being said, Claudius͛ Đoƌpoƌeal shell is Ŷot utteƌlǇ 
devoid of a spiritual intention, he commits himself wholeheartedly to the task of killing Hamlet and it 
is this which proves to be his downfall.  
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Chapter 4: Walking Dead 
This chapter will argue that ghosts can be corporeal, proposing that Prince Hamlet himself 
can be considered as a ghost and that in this deconstructive state of existence he can bring about 
revolutionary changes in the state of Denmark. Beginning with the definitions of a spectre from, 
Rodolphe Gasché as well as from the writings of Derrida, we will consider the ghostliness of various 
scenes in the play. A quote from Derek Attridge based on the exteriority of the ghost of the King in 
the first Act will demonstrate how, in Hamlet, the ghost occupies a physical space in the world at the 
start of the play. This initial ghost acts as a catalyst to the subsequent actions that drive the plot 
forward and gives rise to other types of ghosts; including the corporeal ghost of Hamlet, the spirit of 
revolution and the ghost of the undecidable. I will then go on to demonstrate the deconstructive 
nature of a ghost͛s eǆisteŶĐe, as it is siŵultaŶeouslǇ ǀisiďle aŶd iŶǀisiďle iŶ the sĐeŶe ďetǁeeŶ 
Hamlet and his mother.11 
 
Following an examination of the recognised ghost of the play, the evaluation will continue by 
arguing that Hamlet himself is a corporeal ghost. Thƌough aŶ aŶalǇsis of Ophelia͛s ghostlǇ eŶĐouŶteƌ 
with Hamlet, paralleled with the meeting he and Horatio have with the ghost of the King, it is 
possible to deem how after his meeting with the ghost Hamlet himself has become a spectre. By 
thinking of Hamlet as a corporeal ghost our certainty and understanding of life and death and 
presence and absence is deconstructed in such a way that we can question our experience of human 
existence. A re-examination of the ͚[t]o be, oƌ Ŷot to ďe͛ (Hamlet, 3.1.55) soliloquy based on the idea 
that Hamlet is a ghost, who has been sent away to England with his death warrant signed, will show 
that Hamlet miraculously manages to reappear on stage in a graveyard in Act 5. Another 
imperceptible ghost in the play that can be detected through an understanding of spectral 
anachrony is the ghost of the undecidable; we can retrospectively bear witness to the presence of 
                                                          
11In chapter 1 this scene was discussed with relation to interiority (see pages 18-19). However, the 
examination of this scene here will more closely consider deconstruction.  
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this invisible ghost in the prayer scene. Finally, in the tragic conclusion of Hamlet the ghosts that 
have been so pivotal to the action and course of the play are laid to rest. Hamlet exists as a 
corporeal ghost and the conventional ways in which we understand or explain life and death are not 
as opposed as we might think. Consequently, this brings about a new way of considering our own 
existence that is not bound up in the notion that life is superior to death. This will lead us to consider 
that Hamlet, as a text, is itself a ghost through the timeless way in which it continues to haunt the 
English language.  
 
The fiƌst step toǁaƌds aƌguiŶg foƌ Haŵlet͛s eǆisteŶĐe as a Đoƌpoƌeal ghost is to defiŶe an 
understanding of what a ghost is. To recap from the last chapter, Derrida͛s definition of a ghost is 
that: ͚the speĐter is a paradoxical incorporation, the becoming-body, a certain phenomenal and 
ĐaƌŶal foƌŵ of the spiƌit͛ ;1994: 5).12 Derrida illustrates here the complexity of understanding a 
ghost, as a ghost is both alive and dead, present and absent. It occupies a physical place in the world 
aŶd is theƌefoƌe ͚ĐaƌŶal͛, ďut it does Ŷot haǀe a ďodilǇ eǆisteŶĐe iŶ the saŵe seŶse that a huŵaŶ 
does, aŶd he theƌefoƌe positioŶs it as a ͚ďeĐoŵiŶg-ďodǇ͛. The deĐoŶstƌuĐtiǀe Ŷatuƌe of the ghost 
questions the superior position of life by being simultaneously alive and dead. A deconstructive 
analysis of ghostliness raises questions about our understanding of life and death and encourages us 
to articulate it in new ways.  
 
Another important concept Derrida formulates that will be useful when discussing Hamlet 
aŶd ghosts is that of ͚hauntology͛ ;Deƌƌida, ϭϵϵϰ: ϭϬͿ. With his usual playfulness, Derrida creates this 
teƌŵ, ǁhiĐh, if pƌoŶouŶĐed as Deƌƌida ǁould ǁith a FƌeŶĐh aĐĐeŶt, is a hoŵophoŶe foƌ ͚oŶtologǇ͛. 
Ontology, as defined by the Oǆfoƌd EŶglish DiĐtioŶaƌǇ, is ͚that depaƌtŵeŶt of ŵetaphǇsiĐs ǁhiĐh 
ƌelates to the ďeiŶg oƌ the esseŶĐe of thiŶgs͛ ;ϮϬϬϰ: ϴϮϰͿ. The teƌŵ hauŶtologǇ ĐoŵďiŶes oŶtologǇ 
with the idea of ghosts: as the ghost is associated with death, hauntology not only is concerned with 
                                                          
12 To see this quotation again in full return to page 42, where spectrality is discussed in relation to spirituality. 
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the Ŷatuƌe of eǆisteŶĐe ďut also ďegiŶs to ͚ĐoŵpƌeheŶd [...] the disĐouƌse of the eŶd͛ ;Deƌƌida, ϭϵϵϰ: 
10). Hauntology considers how Being and existence in the present are also haunted by the spectres 
of the past. As these ghosts have died and returned to the realm of Being they bring with them 
teleological and eschatological ends, thus combining life with death and placing the past alongside 
the present. The chronological disruption and ontological paradox brought about by ghosts are 
characterised ďǇ Deƌƌida͛s teƌŵ hauŶtologǇ.  
 
Rodolphe GasĐhé also giǀes a detailed defiŶitioŶ of a ͚speĐteƌ͛; he aƌgues that the ghost is 
associated with light due to its etymological derivation from the Latin word spectrum, saying that 
the spectre results from the ͚deĐoŵpositioŶ aŶd ƌefƌaĐtioŶ of suŶlight͛ ;ϮϬϭϮ: ϭϱϱͿ. Hoǁeǀeƌ, 
Gasché also recognises that the ghost is a deconstructive figure, despite being a thing of the light it is 
also assoĐiated ǁith daƌkŶess: ͚the specter is a ďeiŶg tied to the Ŷight͛ ;ϮϬϭϮ: ϭϱϱͿ. GasĐhé͛s 
definition is also useful when we place Hamlet in its historical context; the play would have been 
performed in the open-roofed theatre of The Globe in broad daylight, yet the opening scene takes 
place at night. The contradiction between light and darkness would have had literal significance to 
the audience, adding to the philosophical exploration in the play of the contrast between light and 
dark, presence and absence, life and death. As well as suggesting this contradictory understanding of 
a speĐtƌe, GasĐhé states iŶ his defiŶitioŶ that a ghost ͚possesses a disappeaƌiŶg, epheŵeƌal 
eǆisteŶĐe, ŵoƌe dead thaŶ aliǀe͛ ;ϮϬϭϮ: ϭϱϱͿ. Hoǁeǀeƌ, the ghost is Ŷot alǁaǇs ŶeĐessaƌilǇ ŵoƌe 
dead than alive but can also be more alive than dead. This is the case in Hamlet where Hamlet is a 
Đoƌpoƌeal ghost aŶd is dooŵed, as his fatheƌ͛s ghost is: ͚foƌ a ĐeƌtaiŶ teƌŵ to ǁalk the Ŷight͛ ;Hamlet, 
1.5.10), until he can achieve justice for his father which will result, ultimately, in his own death. 
   
One way to argue that ghosts are corporeal in Hamlet is to turn to the first appearance of 
the ghost iŶ the plaǇ. The stage diƌeĐtioŶ ƌeads ͚EŶteƌ Ghost͛ ;Hamlet, 1.1.38), as Attridge notes: 
͚“hakespeaƌe eǆteƌioƌizes the ghost iŶ the fiƌst sĐeŶe͛ ;ϮϬϬϭ: ϭϳϲ). An actor playing the part of the 
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ghost walks on stage; therefore the ghost initially has a physical presence. Attridge also describes 
the ghost as a ͚ďoƌdeƌliŶe Đƌeatuƌe͛ ;ϮϬϬϭ: ϭϳϲͿ) suggesting that a ghost does not just appear as an 
image, as Gasché indicates in his definition, but that it has a corporeal existence. The ghost is more 
than a spectral image that is produced by one imagination – it is a physical Being seen by multiple 
witnesses in the first scene of the play. However, once the ghost has left the stage MaƌĐellus saǇs: ͚It 
faded oŶ the ĐƌoǁiŶg of the ĐoĐk͛ ;Hamlet, 1.1.156), which contrastingly implies that the ghost is 
affiliated ǁith the light as GasĐhé͛s defiŶitioŶ stated. DeĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ ĐaŶ ďe used as a ŵeaŶs to 
understand these competing ideas: the ghost is both a corporeal presence and an image-like spectre 
that can walk onto the stage and fade away from it.  
 
To complicate matters further, the paradoxical entity of the ghost (that is simultaneously 
Being and non-Being) is not only presented as a visible entity but, later in the play, is also invisible – 
as discussed in chapter 1. The fiƌst sĐeŶe pƌeseŶts us ǁith a phǇsiĐal ghost, the ghost of Haŵlet͛s 
father, which walks onto the stage and is witnessed by Marcellus, Barnardo and Horatio. Yet later in 
the play when Hamlet visits his mother in her chambers, the ghost appears physically on stage yet is 
seen and heard only by Hamlet. In this scene the ghost is concurrently visible and invisible, and 
deconstruction allows us to comprehend this paradoxical coexistence. When the ghost enters 
Geƌtƌude͛s Đhaŵďeƌ Hamlet speaks to it and Gertrude asks: ͚Alas, hoǁ is͛t ǁith Ǉou, / That Ǉou do 
ďeŶd Ǉouƌ eǇe oŶ ǀaĐaŶĐǇ / AŶd ǁith th͛iŶĐoƌpoƌal aiƌ do hold disĐouƌse?͛ ;Hamlet, 3.4.112-13). 
Shakespeare uses this scene, in which Hamlet interacts with the ghost but Gertrude is unaware of its 
presence, to demonstrate the deconstructive duality of the ghost. The ghost is at once visible (to 
Hamlet) and invisible (to Gertrude); it is both present and absent as well as corporeal and 
incorporeal, as the spectre is not constrained to adhere to one fixed side of these binaries. It is the 
ghost͛s deĐoŶstƌuĐtiǀe ĐapaĐitǇ that alloǁs Haŵlet to see the ghost ǁhile Geƌtƌude ĐaŶŶot.  
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After examining both the visible and invisible encounters with the recognised ghost of the 
plaǇ, that of Haŵlet͛s fatheƌ, ǁe haǀe deǀeloped a ďasis fƌoŵ ǁhiĐh to aƌgue foƌ the ǀaƌious ǁaǇs iŶ 
ǁhiĐh the pƌotagoŶist is hiŵself a ghost. AŶ aŶalǇsis of Ophelia͛s eŶĐouŶteƌ ǁith Haŵlet ǁill ďegiŶ 
to reveal Haŵlet͛s ghostliŶess. In Act 2 Scene 1 Ophelia recounts to her father a distressing visit she 
has received fƌoŵ Haŵlet; she eǆĐlaiŵs, ͚[M]Ǉ loƌd, I haǀe ďeeŶ so affƌighted͛ ;Hamlet, 2.1.73). She 
theŶ goes oŶ to eǆplaiŶ hoǁ a ͚[p]ale͛ Haŵlet Đaŵe iŶto heƌ Đhamber looking as though he had been 
͚loosed out of hell͛ ;Hamlet, 2.1.78-80) and without speaking grabbed her by the wrist and stared at 
heƌ faĐe ǁhilst ŵakiŶg souŶds ͚so piteous aŶd pƌofouŶd / As it did seeŵ to shatteƌ all his ďulk / AŶd 
eŶd his ďeiŶg͛ ;Hamlet, 2.1.92-93). Pale as a ghost, and groaning to boot Hamlet is the walking dead, 
and this silent encounter with Ophelia depicts his ghostly return to haunt the woman he loves. 
FolloǁiŶg Haŵlet͛s ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶ ǁith the ghost, ǁheƌe he is giǀeŶ the task of aǀeŶgiŶg his fatheƌ͛s 
death, Hamlet is a dead man walking. He cannot carry out his task without it resulting in his own 
demise. The scene that Ophelia recounts to her father shows Hamlet as a corporeal ghost, he is alive 
but destined to die. His visit to Ophelia is a ghostly one, but one with the difference of corporeality.  
 
On learning Horatio has seen the ghost of his father, Hamlet asks Horatio if the ghost is 
͚[p]ale, oƌ ƌed?͛ Hoƌatio ƌeplies, ͚NaǇ, ǀeƌǇ pale͛ ;Hamlet, 1.2.231-232). When Ophelia later remarks 
oŶ Haŵlet͛s pale ĐouŶteŶaŶĐe ǁheŶ she aŶd he ŵet, the audieŶĐe ĐaŶ assoĐiate this ǁith the eaƌlieƌ 
paleness of the ghost seen by Horatio; Shakespeare thus offers the audience a means of identifying 
the spectre in the later scene through the parallel between these ghostly encounters. Another 
iŶstaŶĐe of this speĐtƌal ideŶtifiĐatioŶ iŶ the lateƌ sĐeŶe ĐaŶ ďe fouŶd iŶ Ophelia͛s oďseƌǀatioŶ that, 
as well as having an appearance that is ghostly pale, Hamlet looks as though he has been ͚loosed out 
of hell / To speak of hoƌƌoƌs͛ ;Hamlet, 2.1.80-81). This again harks back to the earlier ghost scene on 
two counts: the ghost is released from hell in the hours of darkness to tell Hamlet of the horror that 
is his murder, the ghost confesses: ͚I am [...]/ for the day confined to fast in fires/ Till the foul crimes 
doŶe iŶ ŵǇ daǇs of Ŷatuƌe/ Aƌe ďuƌŶt aŶd puƌged aǁaǇ͛ ;Hamlet, 1.5.9, 11-13); also, whilst Hamlet, 
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iŶ Ophelia͛s eǇes, looks as though he Đould ͚speak of hoƌƌoƌs͛, the ghost of Haŵlet͛s father does 
return to speak of one particular horror, that of his murder by his brother.  
 
BǇ ŵakiŶg these assoĐiatioŶs ďetǁeeŶ the ƌetuƌŶ of the ghost of Haŵlet͛s fatheƌ aŶd 
Haŵlet͛s ǀisit to Ophelia ǁe ĐaŶ ƌeĐogŶise Haŵlet͛s oǁŶ speĐtƌalitǇ iŶ this sĐene. However, Hamlet 
is a ghost in a sense different from that in which his father is a ghost: although Hamlet is a spectre, 
he is a Đoƌpoƌeal oŶe; Ophelia pƌoŶouŶĐes, ͚He took ŵe ďǇ the ǁƌist͛ ;Hamlet, 2.1.84). Despite being 
a silent, pale-faced spectre Hamlet is corporeal; he can touch people and interact with the world. 
Ophelia͛s ĐoŵŵeŶt of hoǁ Haŵlet͛s sighs seemed to ͚eŶd his ďeiŶg͛ ƌeŵiŶd us of Haŵlet͛s eaƌlieƌ 
retort to his mother: ͚NaǇ it is, I kŶoǁ Ŷot ͞seeŵs͛͟ ;Hamlet, 1.2.76). At the start of the play Hamlet 
can be certain of the distinction between what is present and what is absent. Yet, following his 
encounter with the ghost he is no longer convinced by the metaphysics of presence (that is 
privileging presence over absence), as he can no longer ďe ĐeƌtaiŶ of ǁhat is aŶd is Ŷot. Haŵlet͛s 
Being as he knew it has ended. He is no longer certain of reality, which leaves him as a ghost himself, 
haunted by the task that his father has set him and destined to die at the end of the play. The 
spectacular ghostly return of the recently dead King Hamlet aŶd the pƌotagoŶist͛s ghost-like 
encounter with Ophelia are not the only spectral visitations that Shakespeare offers us: there is yet 
another from Prince Hamlet in Act 5.  
 
After discovering that Hamlet has (albeit unintentionally) murdered Polonius, King Claudius 
decides to send Hamlet away to England (Hamlet, 4.3.40-46); unlike us, Hamlet is unaware that the 
KiŶg͛s ͚soǀeƌeigŶ pƌoĐess͛ is the ͚pƌeseŶt death of Haŵlet͛ ;Hamlet, 4.3.61-63). After Hamlet has 
been sent away, to what should be his death, we next see him appear, as if by a miracle, on stage in 
a graveyard – a miracle elucidated when he recounts his journey to England to Horatio and explains 
hoǁ he suƌƌeptitiouslǇ disĐoǀeƌed a letteƌ ďeaƌiŶg the ĐoŵŵaŶd that his ͚head should ďe stƌuĐk off͛ 
(Hamlet, 4.2.25). Yet, in a sense, Hamlet is alƌeadǇ dead; Hoƌatio͛s ĐoŵpaŶioŶ iŶ the gƌaǀeǇaƌd is a 
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revenant. Having witnessed the ghost of his father and read his own death warrant, Hamlet, says 
Deƌƌida iŶ his essaǇ ͚The Tiŵe is Out of JoiŶt͛ (1995), has ͚seen the impossible and he cannot survive 
ǁhat he has suƌǀiǀed͛ ;ϭϵϵϱ: ϯϲͿ; Haŵlet ĐaŶŶot suƌǀiǀe ďut his eǆisteŶĐe ĐoŶtiŶues as a Đoƌpoƌeal 
ghost. Just as the ghost of Haŵlet͛s fatheƌ ideŶtified hiŵself eaƌlieƌ, Ŷot iŶ ƌespoŶse to Hoƌatio͛s 
question: ͚What aƌt thou […]?͛ ;Hamlet, 1.1.ϰϱͿ ďut to Haŵlet hiŵself: ͚I aŵ Ǉouƌ fatheƌ͛s spiƌit͛ 
(Hamlet, 1.5.9), so Hamlet, as a spectral entity, now feels it necessary to identify himself in the 
gƌaǀeǇaƌd: ͚This is I, / Haŵlet the DaŶe͛ ;Hamlet, 5.1.246). This announcement is foreshadowed 
earlier when Hamlet addresses the ghost of his father, he deĐlaƌes: ͚I ǁill speak to thee. I͛ll Đall thee 
Haŵlet, / kiŶg, fatheƌ, ƌoǇal DaŶe͛ ;Hamlet, 1.4.44-45). By applying spectral anachrony here it is 
possible to recognise that, through a retrospective analysis, there is a spectral identification 
between these declaratives; the spectre is anachronic and despite the temporal distance between 
these utterances they are connected by the spectre of death. In Specters of Marx Derrida notes the 
necessity for people to ͚oŶtologize ƌeŵaiŶs͛ ;ϭϵϵϰ: 9) in order to commence the work of mourning. 
Denial that Hamlet is in fact a ghost stems from his corporeality, we know what space he occupies, 
and there is no need for the audience to ontologise his remains, as his self-proclamation gives us a 
satisfactory understanding of his existence and bypasses the work of mourning.13 However, this 
prevents us from looking further into a hauntological understanding of Hamlet, who has just been 
sent to death and resurfaced in a graveyard.  
 
BǇ ƌetuƌŶiŶg to AĐt ϯ “ĐeŶe ϭ at this poiŶt aŶd eǆaŵiŶiŶg the ͚To ďe, oƌ Ŷot to ďe͛ (Hamlet, 
3.1.55) soliloquy, where Hamlet muses extensively on death, we can gain a new understanding of 
both the famous soliloƋuǇ aŶd the Ŷatuƌe of Haŵlet͛s eǆisteŶĐe iŶ the plaǇ. IŶ the speeĐh Haŵlet 
dƌaǁs paƌallels ďetǁeeŶ death aŶd sleep ͚to die: to sleep — / No ŵoƌe,͛ ;Hamlet, 3.1.59-60). If death 
is ͚to sleep Ŷo ŵoƌe͛ theŶ it is peƌtiŶeŶt that, as he tells Hoƌatio, ǁhen Hamlet is travelling to 
                                                          
13 As Prince Hamlet is a corporeal ghost his self-proclamation bypasses the work of mourning. This is not the 
case when King Hamlet declares ͚I aŵ Ǉou fatheƌ͛s spiƌit͛ ;Hamlet, 1.5.9) because the ghost is, unlike the 
pƌiŶĐe, Ŷot eŶtiƌelǇ Đoƌpoƌeal ;the ghost is desĐƌiďed to fade aǁaǇ ͚oŶ the ĐƌoǁiŶg of the ĐoĐk͛ ;Hamlet, 
1.1.156).  
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EŶglaŶd, theƌe is iŶ his heaƌt ͚a kiŶd of fightiŶg / That ǁould Ŷot let [hiŵ] sleep͛ ;Hamlet, 5.2.4-5). 
Hamlet cannot sleep as he is destined to live in a death-like state of corporeal ghostliness. The most 
telling suggestion that Haŵlet is a ghost that ǁe leaƌŶ iŶ this speeĐh is that death is ͚[t]he 
uŶdisĐoǀeƌed ĐouŶtƌǇ fƌoŵ ǁhose ďouƌŶ / No tƌaǀelleƌ ƌetuƌŶs͛ ;Hamlet, 3.1.78-79). However, 
Haŵlet͛s fatheƌ does return; he returns as a ghost in search of vengeance. Similarly, Hamlet travels 
to an undiscovered country, he is sent away with his signed death warrant to England. Hamlet also 
returns from the undiscovered country, as his ghostly existence continues in his quest for revenge. 
Hamlet comes back from England and is next seen again in the graveyard talking to the Sexton; as 
the gravedigger sings to the dead skulls he unearths, he also converses with Hamlet, the living dead. 
Hamlet continues to exist as a spectre, he is both doomed to die and cursed to live until he has 
attained his unfinished business in killing Claudius, at which point he will be able to die and his 
ghostly presence is no longer necessary.  
 
Elseǁheƌe iŶ the soliloƋuǇ Haŵlet asks ͚ǁho ǁould ďeaƌ the ǁhips aŶd sĐoƌŶs of tiŵe͛ 
(Hamlet, 3.1.ϲϵͿ, ǁhiĐh ďƌiŶgs to ŵiŶd Haŵlet͛s eaƌlieƌ phƌase aŶd oŶe ǁith ǁhiĐh Derrida himself is 
pƌeoĐĐupied: ͚the tiŵe is out of joiŶt͛ ;Hamlet, 2.1.186). The arrival of the ghost at the beginning of 
the play prompts Hamlet to make this statement; the ghost disrupts the chronology of the play as, in 
terms of hauntology, it brings the past alongside the present, thus deconstructing any logical 
understanding of time. In his essaǇ ͚The Tiŵe is Out of JoiŶt͛ Deƌƌida Ŷotes that ͚is͛ is ͚the thiƌd 
person singular present indicative of the verb to be͛ (Derrida, 1995: 24). Time and Being are 
inextricably linked. Our understanding of what it means to exist is bound up with our understanding 
of a linear chronology of time. The ghost disturbs our understanding of time as well as of Being. 
WheŶ Haŵlet ƋuestioŶs ͚ǁho ǁould ďeaƌ the ǁhips aŶd sĐoƌŶs of tiŵe͛ ;Hamlet, 3.1.69), we can 
therefore consider the ways in which Hamlet, as a ghost, defies the constraints that time places 
upon him. As he is a spectre, Hamlet haunts the play without giving a term to his mourning and does 
not respond to the demand for immediate vengeance, instead deferring revenge in favour of seeking 
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to attain justice. After ƋuestioŶiŶg ǁhǇ people suffeƌ ͚[t]o gƌuŶt aŶd sǁeat uŶdeƌ a ǁeaƌǇ life͛ 
(Hamlet, 3.1.7ϲͿ, Haŵlet suggests that ŵaŶ ŵight hiŵself ͚his Ƌuietus ŵake / With a ďaƌe ďodkiŶ͛ 
(Hamlet, 3.1.74-75). Why does Hamlet not simply commit suicide? He suggests it here and already in 
Act 1 sĐeŶe Ϯ he has ǁished that the ͚EǀeƌlastiŶg had Ŷot fiǆed / His ĐaŶoŶ ͚gaiŶst self-slaughteƌ͛ 
(Hamlet, 1.2.131-32). At the start of the play it is because God has forbidden it, however after his 
encounter with his father Hamlet is a corporeal ghost so he cannot commit suicide; he must 
continue to exist until the quest he has set himself to attain justice has been completed. 
 
Afteƌ lookiŶg at the ghost of the dead ǁalkiŶg ;Haŵlet͛s fatheƌͿ aŶd the ǁalkiŶg dead 
(Hamlet himself), it is now time to make visible the invisible ghost of the play. Hamlet has an 
opportunity to murder the king whilst he is praying, and he refuses to do it. The following analysis of 
this ͚pƌaǇeƌ sĐeŶe͛ iŶ the ĐoŶteǆt of Deƌƌida͛s ǁƌitiŶg oŶ the ghost of the uŶdeĐidaďle ǁill help to 
illuminate this invisible ghost. First of all it is important to define what we mean by the ghost of the 
uŶdeĐidaďle. IŶ his essaǇ oŶ ͚FoƌĐe of Laǁ͛ Deƌƌida states that ͚[t]he uŶdeĐidaďle ƌeŵaiŶs Đaught, 
lodged, at least as a ghost — but an essential ghost — iŶ eǀeƌǇ deĐisioŶ͛ ;ϭϵϵϮ: ϮϰͿ. IŶ oƌdeƌ to ŵake 
a difficult decision one must go through the ordeal of the undecidable, and Derrida describes this 
necessary uncertainty as a ghost. The ghost of the undecidable deconstructs the opposition between 
yes and no. The prayer scene in Hamlet allows the audience to bear witness to the coexistence of 
certainty with uncertainty in the ghost of an impossible decision.  
 
Left alone at the end of Act 3 scene 3, the King guiltily begins to pray, giving voice to his 
crimes as he does so. While Claudius is thus engaged, Hamlet enters behind him, declares: ͚AŶd Ŷoǁ 
I͛ll do it͛ ;Hamlet, 3.3.74) and, as he prepares himself to kill his step-father, draws his sword. At this 
moment in the play as Hamlet hovers behind Claudius with the sword raised above his head, ready 
to bring it down on him and kill him, the ghost of the undecidable presents itself, and Hamlet 
ƌeĐoŶsideƌs ŵuƌdeƌiŶg Claudius ǁhilst he is pƌaǇiŶg, as he does Ŷot ǁaŶt ͚[t]o take hiŵ iŶ the 
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puƌgiŶg of his soul / WheŶ he is fit aŶd seasoŶed foƌ his passage͛ ;Hamlet, 3.3.85-86). Hamlet goes 
from decided action (drawing the sword to kill Claudius) to uncertainty and inaction (talking himself 
out of killing Claudius and sheathing the sword). Through a deconstructive analysis we can see how 
this moment in the prayer scene combines the presence of the action of raising the sword with the 
absence of inaction. Although intangible, the act of faltering brings together presence and absence 
in a process of deconstruction that the ghostly provides. The ghost of the undecidable is present and 
visible in the raised sword but at the same time is invisible, as this ghost is incorporeal. Nevertheless, 
it is only through spectral anachrony that it is possible to bear witness to this ghost. The spectre of 
the undecidable that is at work here can only be recognised through a retrospective analysis with 
the understanding of a deconstructive line of thought in mind.  
 
This discussion of spectrality within the play leads to an analysis of the spectrality of the text 
itself. In Specters of Marx Deƌƌida Ŷotes: ͚A masterpiece always moves, by definition, in the manner 
of a ghost͛ ;ϮϬϬϲ: ϮϬ-ϮϭͿ. “hakespeaƌe͛s Hamlet has itself become a ghost through its enduring 
reputation; for example the phƌase ͚[t]o be, oƌ Ŷot to ďe͛ (Hamlet, 3.1.55) is recognised worldwide. 
Just as a ghost is timeless, the play itself is timeless and continues to haunt the English language in 
the twenty-fiƌst ĐeŶtuƌǇ. ͚The ghost is as ŵuĐh event as oďjeĐt͛ (Attridge, 1995: 224), which is 
certainly the case here. The timeless text of Hamlet, in its unstable form consisting of three different 
versions (the first quarto, the second quarto and the folio), is a presence that haunts the whole of 
the English language and continues so to do. Hamlet acts like a ghost in the way it haunts the very 
language we use and, in this sense, is a ghostly event as Attridge suggests the ghost can be. 
 
Hamlet is a play filled with ghosts. Although they are often side-lined and cast aside as a 
strange supernatural phenomena, ghosts are actually integral to the plot and actions in the play, as 
an analysis of the various types of ghostliness that Shakespeare uses throughout the play helps us to 
uŶdeƌstaŶd. Had the ghost of Haŵlet͛s fatheƌ Ŷot ƌetuƌŶed fƌoŵ ďeǇoŶd the gƌaǀe to set Haŵlet the 
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challenging task of murdering his own uncle, then Hamlet would have stuck with the decision he 
ŵade ďefoƌe leaƌŶiŶg the tƌue Ŷatuƌe of his fatheƌ͛s death; that ďeiŶg: ͚But ďƌeak, ŵǇ heaƌt, foƌ I 
ŵust hold ŵǇ toŶgue͛ ;Hamlet, 1.2.159). Instead the ghost acts as a catalyst to the plot, giving 
Hamlet motive to break his silence and take action against his uncle. Without the ghost of the 
undecidable interrupting Hamlet as he is about to take his revenge the play would be over before 
Act 4 even begins.  
 
Our protagonist is himself a revolutionary ghost; he is a walking dead man, haunting the play 
to bring about the necessary changes for the state. Hamlet is simultaneously living and dead, and 
this brings the very nature of Being into question: in his paradoxical state of existence Hamlet is an 
agent of revolution. Revolution is itself a spirit untouchable yet present, and in Hamlet the state of 
Denmark is on the cusp of revolutionary change. With young Fortinbras and his army, and Laertes 
and his mob of protestors, the monarchy is about to change hands.14 Deƌƌida͛s iŶteƌest iŶ this 
spectre of the revolution is influenced by his discussion of Marxism, in Specters of Marx Derrida tells 
us: ͚Maƌǆ thought [...] that the diǀidiŶg liŶe ďetǁeeŶ the ghost aŶd aĐtualitǇ ought to ďe Đƌossed, like 
utopia itself, ďǇ a ƌealizatioŶ, that is, ďǇ a ƌeǀolutioŶ;͛ ;ϭϵϵϰ: ϰϳͿ. Hamlet is as an agent to the spirit 
of revolution; himself crossing the line between ghostliness and actuality and as a ghost himself 
Hamlet is not bound to life but as a Being neither living nor dead can propel the spirit of revolution 
to the logiĐal eŶdpoiŶt of the plaǇ. The death of Claudius duƌiŶg the plaǇ͛s fiŶal sĐeŶe ďƌiŶgs aďout 
advantageous changes to Denmark. 
 
This leads us to consider the denouement of Hamlet. The command of his fatheƌ͛s ghost, 
that Haŵlet ͚[l]et Ŷot the ƌoǇal ďed of DeŶŵaƌk ďe. / A ĐouĐh foƌ luǆuƌǇ aŶd daŵŶed iŶĐest͛ ;Hamlet, 
1.5.82) acts on him like a curse, since the mission to attain justice – to which Hamlet commits 
                                                          
14The spirit of the revolution is apparent from the uneasy commencement of the play. Horatio explains to 
Marcellus and Barnardo the reason they are on watch is due to anxieties over young Fortinbras gathering an 
army against Denmark to reclaim the land his father has lost (see Hamlet, 1.1.94-105).  
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himself – will ultimately result not only in his killing the King, his uncle, but also his own death. In his 
Đhapteƌ oŶ ͚Haŵlet aŶd the LiǀiŶg Dead͛, Chƌistofides eǆaŵiŶes the fiŶal sĐeŶe of the plaǇ aŶd 
insightfully proposes that:  
 
[...] ƌeǀeŶge takes us to a liŵiŶal poiŶt ďetǁeeŶ life aŶd death […] close to death, still alive 
but fatally poisoned, [Hamlet] delivers justice from a place neither living nor dead  
(2012: 63) 
In order to be the agent of the spirit of revolution and the minister of death Hamlet must himself be 
a ghost. However, Hamlet not only is a ghost in the final scene of the play in order to take his 
revenge but also has been a ghost throughout the majority of the play, since his own encounter with 
the ghost of his fatheƌ. Deƌƌida iŶ his essaǇ ͚The Tiŵe is Out of JoiŶt͛ saǇs:  
[...] one must stop believing that the dead are just the departed and that the departed do 
nothing. One must stop pretending to know ǁhat is ŵeaŶt ďǇ ͞to die͟ aŶd espeĐiallǇ ďǇ 
͞dǇiŶg.͟ OŶe has, then, to talk about spectrality. 
(1995: 30) 
Not only is this quote relatable to deconstruction, as discussed in the introduction to this thesis, but 
is relatable to spectrality as a whole. Both King Hamlet the father and Hamlet the son have been 
haunting the play. Death is not a barrier to the spectres in Hamlet, as, regardless of their state of 
existence, be that spirit or corporeal ghost; they walk the stage and interact with the living in order 
to bring about revolutionary changes in the world. Once those revolutionary changes are achieved 
the ghosts are no longer required. By the end of the play, the corporeal ghost of Hamlet has, in 
killing Claudius, carried out the task for which he has been kept in his ghostly state; this allows 
Hamlet finally to achieve the peace of death, and his ghost is thus laid to rest.   As Hamlet delivers 
total justice to the murderers of this play, namely Claudius, the spirit of revolution is free to bring 
about changes to the state of Denmark and thus Hamlet can succeed in what he set out to do, that is 
to ͚set it ƌight͛ ;Hamlet, 2.1.187).  
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In arguing that ghosts can be corporeal, as we see the protagonist is in the play, the 
certainty of our knowledge of reality and unreality, of life and death, of presence and absence, is 
deconstructed. The ghost is more than a liminal entity that strangely appears then disappears; it is 
an integral part of the play and necessary for our understanding of it. Hamlet needs the ghost of the 
King to appear in order that it acts as a catalyst to the action that follows; it requires Hamlet himself 
to act as a ghost and an agent of revolutionary change. As the ghost of the undecidable surfaces, a 
ghost is also an absent presence in every difficult decision, as we saw in the prayer scene. In his 
analysis of the ghost scene in Hamlet Derrida recognises Barnardo͛s ͚iƌƌepƌessiďle desire for 
ideŶtifiĐatioŶ͛ ;ϭϵϵϰ: 11) of the ghost. In arguing for corporeal ghosts we are in part falling into the 
trap of the metaphysics of presence, that is, privileging presence over absence, in what Derrida 
teƌŵs ouƌ ͚iƌƌepƌessiďle desiƌe͛ to ideŶtifǇ the uŶkŶoǁŶ. Hoǁeǀeƌ, iŶ its eǆaŵiŶatioŶ of the ǁaǇs iŶ 
which ghosts are simultaneously both alive and dead and present and absent, this deconstructive 
analysis considers not only the opposing sides of these binaries in order to contemplate the ways in 
which they coexist, but also that neither is superior to the other, thus dispelling any privilege of 
presence in favour of deconstruction. This thesis has shed light on our understanding of the terms 
we use to discuss life and death and has engaged with applying those terms to Hamlet in order to 
gain a new way to understand spectrality.  
 
We have also considered the ghostliness of Hamlet, as the text itself is a ghost. Certain 
phrases from the play have been adopted into our contemporary idioŵ, suĐh as ͚ŵethod iŶ the 
ŵadŶess͛ aŶd ͚eǀeƌǇ dog has his daǇ͛; thƌough these “hakespeaƌe is pƌeseŶt iŶ the tǁeŶtǇ-first 
century.  However, the idiomatic expressions we use today have been contracted down, and the 
original phrases: ͚Though this ďe ŵadŶess Ǉet theƌe is ŵethod iŶ͛t͛ ;Hamlet, 2.2.202-203) and ͚[t]he 
Đat ǁill ŵeǁ aŶd dog ǁill haǀe his daǇ͛ ;Hamlet, 5.1.281) are not used as they were originally 
written. Hamlet is both present in our modern language, through the adoption of phrases from the 
play, but is also absent as these phrases have been transformed from their original wording. In this 
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way Hamlet is both present and absent and is a spectre that haunts the English language. Discussing 
ghosts iŶ “hakespeaƌe͛s Hamlet has led us to consider the nature of human existence and the notion 
of ghostliness. We are all the walking dead, alive for a time but destined to die one day. Perhaps 
ghosts are corporeal, as all people are ghosts and maybe our work of marginalising ghosts of the 
spirit is simply a work of easing our own conscience. Thus, the spectre acts as a reminder of our own 
ghostliness; in attempting to keep ghosts distinct from ourselves we simply try to distance ourselves 
from the dead, privileging ourselves as living Beings over ghosts when in fact we are one and the 
same. Our only understanding lies in the hauntological difference between the dead walking and the 
walking dead. 
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Conclusion 
 BǇ aŶalǇsiŶg Deƌƌida͛s ǁƌitiŶgs oŶ Hamlet, in this thesis, a new way of thinking has come to 
light; the inextricable combination of spectrality with anachrony, which was already present within 
Deƌƌida͛s ǁƌitiŶg, has ďeeŶ fullǇ pƌopouŶded heƌe. This thesis has eŶdeaǀouƌed to shoǁ the 
importance of this connection by producing the term spectral anachrony, as well as applying this 
term theoretically as an approach to our understanding of Hamlet, that considers the possibility of 
the atemporality of a spectre. Through our retrospective analysis of the play, that accepts this 
possibility, we have been able to recognise the anachronic functioning of various spectres that have 
always already been at work. 
We began, in the first chapter, to outline a distinction between a Freudian conception of 
ŵouƌŶiŶg aŶd Deƌƌida͛s defiŶitioŶ of ŵouƌŶiŶg. Deƌƌida aƌgues that the ͚ǁoƌk of ŵouƌŶiŶg͛ ;Fƌeud, 
ϭϵϭϳ: ϮϰϱͿ is iŶ faĐt ͚iŶteƌŵiŶaďle͛ ;Deƌƌida, ϭϵϵϲ: ϭϳϮͿ aŶd, uŶlike Fƌeud, suggests that ŵouƌŶiŶg 
can never be completed. With this foundational understanding in mind we continued by discussing 
death as a spectre, as before and after death both the idea of death, and the dead themselves, 
continue to haunt the living. In addition to the spectre of death, that haunts the living as they are 
continually employed in the work of mourning, we also considered the anachronic spectre of an 
interior subjectivity. The philosophical understanding of the world was, at the time Hamlet was 
being penned, shifting from an objective to a subjective worldview. As the boundaries between 
objectivity and subjectivity were unstable, Shakespeare began to experiment with this idea in the 
play, hence his initial representation of the ghost as an externalised and visible entity, to the ghost 
as lateƌ possessiŶg aŶ iŶteƌŶal eǆisteŶĐe iŶ Haŵlet͛s ŵiŶd aŶd ďeiŶg iŶǀisiďle to Geƌtƌude. 
“hakespeaƌe͛s ĐhoiĐe to plaǇ ǁith this deǀelopiŶg idea of aŶ iŶteƌioƌ suďjeĐtiǀitǇ iŶ Hamlet is also 
spectrally anachronic, as the spectre of subjectivity haunts the play before Descartes has given a full 
ĐoŵpƌeheŶsioŶ of ǁhat the teƌŵ ŵeaŶs. IŶstead of disŵissiŶg Haŵlet͛s phƌase ͚I haǀe that ǁithiŶ 
ǁhiĐh passes shoǁ͛ ;Hamlet, ϭ.Ϯ.ϴϱͿ as ŵeƌelǇ ͚gestuƌal͛ ;Baƌkeƌ, ϭϵϵϱ: ϯϮͿ as Barker does, this 
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thesis instead proposed that the spectral anachrony of Shakespeare beginning to discuss an interior 
subjectivity should be welcomed. The spectral apparition of King Hamlet throws the prince into 
confusion and doubt. As Hamlet is already in mourning, as well as being melancholic, this visitation 
ĐoŵpliĐates Haŵlet͛s ǁoƌk of ŵouƌŶiŶg, as this ŵakes it iŵpossiďle foƌ hiŵ to iŶteƌioƌise his fatheƌ 
and to accept that dead only continue to exist from within; as iŶ Haŵlet͛s Đase his dead father also 
possesses a ghostly existence. Finally, this chapter outlined the important difference between death 
and peaceful death, as when Prince Hamlet dies at the end of the play the ghost of his father is laid 
to rest and Hamlet himself can rest in peace. 
Just as the first chapter set out to make the distinction between mourning and melancholy, 
so the second chapter also began by making a few important distinctions. The first being the 
difference between justice and the law, although the two are related, justice is a perfect ideal 
whereas the law is calculable and applicable. The second was the difference between revenge and 
justice. Revenge is violent, retributive and obtainable, whereas justice is thought of as being beyond 
earthly reach. Claudius himself conceives justice as divine in comparison to the corruptibility of 
eaƌthlǇ laǁs: ͚In the corrupted currents of this world/ OffeŶĐe͛s gilded hand may shove by justice,/ 
[...] but ͚tis Ŷot so aďoǀe͛ (Hamlet, 3.3.57-58, 60). Derrida, in his elaborate discussioŶ of Haŵlet͛s 
mission ͚to do ƌight, to ƌeŶdeƌ justiĐe, aŶd to ƌedƌess histoƌǇ͛ ;ϭϵϵϰ: 24) overlooks this important 
distinction, as Hamlet is only asked to take revenge. Nonetheless, we reconciled this by arguing that 
Hamlet takes the mission to dispense justice upon himself. In addition to arguing for spectral 
anachrony of an interior subjectivity in chapter 1, chapter 2 continued this discussion by considering 
justice with regards to spectral anachrony. Justice is a spectre that haunts Hamlet throughout the 
play and it is also anachronic, as it requires Hamlet to retrospectively consider the murder of his 
father as well as to think of the possibility of attaining justice in the future. The mission that Hamlet 
has taken upon himself disjoins him from the present time, as the spectre of justice is – like the 
spectre of mourning – anachronic. Justice functions in Hamlet in two forms: the first form of justice 
in Hamlet is served to the guilty: to Gertrude, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, who, having done 
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wrong, receive a fitting form of justice. Gertrude drinks from a cup poisoned by her new lover, her 
husďaŶd͛s ďƌotheƌ, aŶd thus aĐĐideŶtallǇ Đoŵŵits suiĐide aŶd ‘oseŶĐƌaŶtz aŶd GuildeŶsteƌŶ, haǀiŶg 
betrayed their friend are betrayed by their friend and led to their executions. In his mission to 
achieve justice, however, Hamlet kills Polonius, who (although himself not utterly guiltless) becomes 
the collateral damage in his quest. The by-product, as a result of this collateral damage, is the suicide 
of Ophelia; although she kills herself, so she is responsible for her own death, the murder of her 
father drove her to the insanity that caused this act. However, by way of a deconstructive logic this 
chapter set out to explore the paradox that injustice is necessary in the mission to obtain justice, and 
despite coming at a high price, Hamlet does deliver total justice at the end of the play to those who 
have committed murder. This second, totalising form of justice, is dispensed to Claudius for 
murdering King Hamlet, Laertes for murdering Prince Hamlet and to the protagonist Hamlet himself, 
for murdering Polonius. In the same way that Gertrude, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern meet a fitting 
end, so the murderers in this play also appropriately meet their deaths at the hand of the son of 
those they have murdered, or from those they have murdered themselves.  
In the third chapter we saw that the spectre of an interior subjectivity, already discussed in 
the first chapter, is also bound up with the idea of the performative. When Austin defined the 
performative he was aware of the need for an inward and spiritual commitment to the performative. 
Derrida disliked this concept of spirituality as it is inaccessible on an external platform. However, 
Deƌƌida͛s use of speĐtƌalitǇ, although – like spirituality – is connected to the idea of an interior 
subjectivity, offers a slightly different view here with relation to performativity. For Derrida, 
spectrality allows for the embodiment of the internal in order to project it externally. In the case of 
the peƌfoƌŵatiǀe, theƌefoƌe, the peƌfoƌŵatiǀe utteƌaŶĐe is speĐtƌal. It Đƌeates a ͚spiƌitual shaĐkle͛ 
(Austin, 1976: 10), but in being spoken the performative brings the internal intention into contact 
with the external world, thus producing a spectre. Alternatively, when a performative lacks the 
inward and spiritual commitment when it is uttered, then such a spectre is not produced. The 
eǆaŵple ĐhoseŶ to deŵoŶstƌate this ǁas Claudius͛ pƌaǇeƌ; as the pƌaǇeƌ is holloǁ it does Ŷot 
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produce a spectre from the performative and the utterance does not bind him to a future 
commitment. When a felicitous performative is uttered, such as the oath that Horatio and Marcellus 
sǁeaƌ to, that Deƌƌida Đalls the ͚oƌigiŶaƌǇ peƌfoƌŵatiǀitǇ͛ ;ϭϵϵϰ: ϯϲͿ, theŶ it is possible to analyse the 
spectral anachrony of the performative, as the commitment which they make when they utter the 
performative ͚IŶ faith, ŵǇ loƌd, Ŷot I͛ ;Hamlet, 1.5.145), that swears their silence, they already prove 
to have been adhering to. In the retrospective recognition of this, we can deem the spectre, which 
the performative has produced, to be anachronic. The important distinction made in this chapter, 
theŶ, ǁas the diffeƌeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ AustiŶ͛s ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of spiƌitualitǇ aŶd Deƌƌida͛s ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of 
spectrality. Although the two are connected: spirituality is entirely internal, whereas with spectrality 
Derrida combines this idea of the internal, interior subjectivity with the external, verbal 
commitment; thus altering our understanding of performativity.  
In the final chapter, after looking at the spectrality of mourning, of justice and of 
performativity, I proposed that Prince Hamlet himself is a spectre that is kept alive to bring about 
justice at the end of the play; which also coincides with the spirit of revolution, as advantageous 
changes are made to set the state to right. Unlike his father, who is the dead walking, Hamlet is the 
walking dead, who is similarly a ghost but with the difference of corporeality. To offer an example of 
Haŵlet͛s ghostliness a comparison between, Haŵlet͛s eŶĐouŶteƌ ǁith the ghost, and, Ophelia͛s 
silent encounter with Hamlet, revealed a spectral identification between these two ghastly events. 
In addition to this we re-assessed the: ͚To ďe, oƌ Ŷot to ďe͛ ;Hamlet, 3.1.55) soliloquy, with this 
reconsideration that Hamlet is a corporeal ghost who has been sent to his death, viewed his own 
death warrant and then is next seen on stage in a graveyard. Following which we considered the 
spectral anachrony of the ghost of the undecidable. Although this spectre could not be witnessed at 
first, through spectral anachrony – an approach combining the idea of spectrality with anachrony 
retrospectively – it was possible to consider that, upoŶ ƌefleĐtioŶ, Haŵlet͛s ŵoŵeŶt of hesitatioŶ 
and his act of faltering when attempting to kill Claudius unites presence with absence in a 
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deconstructive sense. Yet, as is the case where spectral anachrony is concerned, this spectre can 
only be recognised retrospectively. 
The application of the term spectral anachrony is itself indebted to the spectre of 
deconstruction, as the idea that spectrality and anachrony are combined was always already present 
ǁithiŶ Deƌƌida͛s ǁƌitiŶgs oŶ Hamlet; however it is only through returning to the text that it is 
possible to recognise that this was already present within his writing. This logic is also the logic of 
deconstruction; spectral anachrony is not a new idea, just as a deconstructive interpretation does 
not say something that was not already in the text itself, rather in the same way that a 
deconstructive reading exposes that which is already in the text, my formulation of spectral 
anachrony just ďƌiŶgs foƌth that ǁhiĐh ǁas alƌeadǇ pƌeseŶt ǁithiŶ Deƌƌida͛s ǁƌitiŶg.  Although the 
idea was already present it could only be fully recognised through the temporal distance of 
ƌetƌospeĐtioŶ aŶd iŶ goiŶg oǀeƌ Deƌƌida͛s ǁoƌk, iŶ ǀieǁ of Hamlet, which was also so influential to 
him, it has been possible to give the idea of spectral anachrony an existence that makes it applicable 
and useful – thus giving this spectre a corporeality in our work and a presence in our thought. 
In this thesis the understanding and application of spectral anachrony has been influential to 
analysing Hamlet, by applying the concept it has been possible to answer the question as to why the 
ghost is initially visible in the play to multiple witnesses and later invisible to Gertrude. It has also 
been possible to recognise the spectral anachrony of justice, as justice is a spectre that is anachronic 
and does not adhere to a chronological flow of time, it is in part as a result of this, as well as due to 
the ǁoƌk of ŵouƌŶiŶg, that Haŵlet deĐlaƌes the tiŵe to ďe ͚out of joiŶt͛ ;Hamlet, 2.1.186). With 
regards to performativity we noted the spectral anachrony of every performative utterance, as in 
uttering a performative a spectre is produced, that continues to haunt the speaker but which can 
also be noticed to have already been at work. As is the case for the oath to silence that Horatio and 
Marcellus swear to. Interestingly, this concept of spectrality that Derrida builds upon is already 
pƌeseŶt iŶ AustiŶ͛s teǆt uŶdeƌ the guise of spiƌitualitǇ. In the final chapter we witnessed the ghost of 
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the undecidable in the prayer scene as a result of spectral anachrony. The undecidable is a spectre 
that combines presence with absence and decision with indecision. In view that this spectre is 
anachronic and should have already been at work in the play it was possible to witness this ghost of 
the uŶdeĐidaďle iŶ Haŵlet͛s ƌaised sword as he chooses to murder Claudius, before swiftly talking 
himself out of it. 
 My concept of spectral anachrony has been useful and applicable. Whilst in this thesis I 
haǀe oŶlǇ disĐussed it iŶ ƌelatioŶ to “hakespeaƌe͛s Hamlet, there is scope to apply this term to other 
texts; in particular, in conjunction with other deconstructive readings, in order to show that 
spectrality and anachrony are inextricably linked and that, when viewed retrospectively, the 
anachronic functioning of various types of spectres can be exposed.  
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